HEARING THE CRIES OF PRISONERS: THE
THIRD CIRCUIT'S TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS' RIGHTS LITIGATION
Lance D. Cassak*
The law, in all vicissitudes of government, fluctuations of passions, or flights of enthusiasm, will preserve a steady undeviating course; it will not bend to the uncertain wishes,
imaginations and wanton tempers of men. . . . On the one
hand it is inexorable to the cries and lamentations of prisoners; on the other, it is deaf, deaf as an adder to the clamors of
the populace. I
I.

INTRODUCTION

Despite assurances for more than fifteen years that "It]here
is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country," 2 it is easy to be cynical about the efforts to
extend the protections guaranteed by the Constitution to those
incarcerated in our prisons and jails. In his novel Falconer,3 John
Cheever captures perfectly the frustrating chaos of prisoners'
rights and institutional rules confronting an inmate attempting to
sue his captors for a deprivation of his rights. Farragut, the protagonist, serving a ten-year sentence for fratricide, also happens
to be a drug addict.4 While in the general prison population,
Farragut's drug problem is treated with a daily dose of methadone. After a search of his cellblock turns up contraband in his
cell, however, Farragut is transferred to solitary confinement,
where guards neglect to give him his methadone. Suffering ex* B.A., Drew University, 1977; M.A., University of Chicago, 1978;J.D., Boston
University, 1981. From 1984 to 1986, the author was a staff attorney with the Office of Inmate Advocacy,New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate. The author is presently associated with the firm of McCarter & English, Newark, N.J. A
number of friends were kind enough to take the time to read an earlier draft and to
provide extensive comments. I would like to thank my brother David Cassak, Milt
Heumann, Avi Soifer and Eric Tunis for their suggestions and contributions. I
would also like to thank Mary Brennan for discussing most of the ideas in this paper
with me and for her help with this project.
I J. Adams, Defense of the British Soldiersfor the Boston Massacre in C. ADAMS, 1 THE
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, 2ND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 110 (1856).
2 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
3 J. CHEEVER, FALCONER (1977).
4 His addiction has nothing to do with his incarceration; Farragut reassures
himself that "[t]he cream of the post-Freudian generation were addicts." Id. at 56.
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cruciating withdrawal pains, Farragut bolts from his cell in an effort to get to the infirmary to obtain his medicine, but he is
stopped by a guard wielding a chair. Farragut's injuries require
twenty-two stitches and he decides to sue. After making certain
that a number of his fellow inmates will serve as witnesses, Farragut arranges to see a lawyer who comes to the prison periodically to help inmates with their legal problems. The following
exchange takes place, started by the lawyer:
"Here are your facts," he said ...."You attempted escape on
the eighteenth and you were disciplined. If you'll just sign this
release here, no charges will be brought." "What kind of
charges?" "Attempted escape," said the lawyer. "You can get
seven years for that. But if you sign this release the whole
thing will be forgotten." He passed Farragut the clipboard
and a pen. Farragut held the board on his knees and the pen
in his hand. "I didn't attempt escape," he said, "and I have
witnesses. I was in the lower tier of cellblock F in the sixth
lock-in of a maximum-security prison. I attempted to leave my
cell, driven by the need for prescribed medicine. If an attempt
to leave one's cell six lock-ins deep in a maximum-security
prison constitutes an attempted escape, this prison is a house
of cards."
"Oh my," said the lawyer. "Why don't you reform the
Department of Correction?"
"The Department of Correction," said Farragut, "is
merely an arm of the judiciary. It is not the warden and the
assholes who sentenced us to prison. It is the judiciary."
"Oh ho ho," said the lawyer. "I have a terrible backache." He leaned forward stiffly and massaged his back with
his right hand. "I got a backache from eating cheeseburgers.
You got any home remedy for backaches contracted while eating cheeseburgers? Just sign the release and I'll leave you and
your opinions alone. You know what they say about
opinions?"
"Yes," said Farragut. "Opinions are like assholes. Everybody has one and they all smell."
"Oh ho ho," said the lawyer ...... You know Charlie?"
the lawyer asked, softly, softly. "I've seen him in chow, " said
Farragut. "I know who he is. I know that nobody speaks to
him."
"Charlie's a great fellow," said the lawyer. "He used to
work for Pennigrino, the top pimp. Charlie used to discipline
the chicks." Now his voice was very low. "When a chick went
wrong Charlie used to break her legs backwards. You want to
play Scrabble with Charlie-you want to play Scrabble with
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Charlie or you want to sign this release?" 5
Life at least sometimes imitates art; for those who would dismiss Cheever's depiction as artistic license, I offer the following
from the United States Supreme Court. In 1984, Chief Justice Burger, writing for a majority of the Court, noted that "the way a society treats those who have transgressed against it is evidence of the
essential character of that society." '6 The full quote makes clear, or
at least strongly suggests, that Chief Justice Burger intended to say
that a society's willingness to recognize rights for those incarcerated
for having violated its laws bespeaks (dare I say) a kinder and gentler nation.7 However, inasmuch as Chief Justice Burger's prescription comes in a case in which the Court ruled categorically that the
fourth amendment does not apply in prisons,8 one may wonder
about the Court's apparent dismal view of the essential character of
society.
Measured against Justice Burger's standard, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has shown at least somewhat more concern for society's character. In this article we will examine the Third
Circuit's recent treatment of cases concerning prisoners' rights. 9 I
do not intend to present a comprehensive overview of the court's
docket in the area of prisoners' rights over the past ten to fifteen
years. Rather, I will consider three cases in depth-Helms v. Hewitt,' Shabazz v. 0 Lone," and Monmouth County CorrectionalInstitution
Inmates v. Lanzaro 2-two of which went on to the Supreme Court.
I chose these cases for the following two reasons. First, the
cases raised serious claims involving important issues; in all three
cases, the Third Circuit faced claims from inmates that prison offiId. at 65-66.
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1984).
7 The full quote, coming after a brief delineation of the various constitutional
rights extended to inmates by the Court over the prior decade, reads as follows:
5

6

"The continuing guarantee of these substantial rights to prison inmates is testimony to a belief that the way a society treats those who have transgressed against it

is evidence of the essential character of that society." Id.
8 Id. at 537. For a fuller discussion of Hudson, see infra notes 154-66 and ac-

companying text.
9 I should clarify what I mean by "prisoners' rights." Persons incarcerated seek
access to the courts for many reasons, including appeal of their underlying convictions and to gain release for unlawful detention through the writ of habeas corpus.
This article deals only with a third category of cases brought by inmates: those in
which inmates have alleged that the conditions of their confinement, either collec-

tively or as a result of specific regulations or practices, deprive them of rights guaranteed to them by the United States Constitution.
10 655 F.2d 487 (3d Cir. 1981), rev d, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
'' 782 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987).
12 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1731 (1988).
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cials had infringed important constitutional rights: the right to due
process in Helms, the right to free exercise of religion in Shabazz, and
the right to privacy, encompassing abortion, in Lanzaro. Equally important, the court took the cases seriously, which is not always true
in prisoners' rights litigation. Second, the court was provided with
an opportunity to speak with its own voice on the issue presented;
although the Third Circuit decided each case against the backdrop
of what the Supreme Court had written about prisoners' rights in
general and on related issues, in none of the cases was the Third
Circuit confronted with Supreme Court precedent that had decided
the precise issue presented by the inmate.
In each of the cases, the Third Circuit supported an expansion
of rights for inmates beyond what the Supreme Court had previously recognized, and, just as important, arguably beyond where the
Supreme Court had indicated a willingness to go. The Third Circuit
arrived at its decisions generally using the tests and framework established by the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the basic approach
to the very idea of prisoners' rights taken by the Third Circuit was, I
hope to demonstrate, significantly different from that taken by the
Supreme Court. Moreover, this difference was critical to the result
reached by the Third Circuit in each case.
Whether, of course, these three cases are representative of the
Third Circuit's general approach to prisoners' rights litigation is a
more difficult claim to make. In any event, examining these three
cases will not only allow us to explore the Third Circuit's approach
toward prisoners' rights litigation, but will also allow us to consider
some broader issues concerning the interaction of the lower federal
courts with the Supreme Court and the role of the lower federal
courts in constitutional adjudication. Specifically, the interplay between the Third Circuit and the Supreme Court in these cases suggests the extent to which the lower federal court does not merely
receive and apply doctrine from the higher Court. Instead, the interplay is more of a dialogue in which the lower court has an important role to play in formulating doctrine, even in areas in which the
Supreme Court is very active.
In contrast to the wealth of material exploring and dissecting
the work of the Supreme Court, there have been relatively few studies of the judicial opinions of, and doctrinal advances emanating
from, the courts of appeals. 3 There have been studies of individual
13 Political scientists and some legal scholars have studied the lower federal
courts from an institutional perspective. See, e.g., R. CARP & R. STIDHAM, THE FEDERAL COURTS (1985); F. FRANKFURTER &J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME
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cases, and occasional biographies of important lower court judges
such as Learned Hand or Jerome Frank.' Some, like Frank, have
commanded attention because of the magnitude and originality of
their work, although generally for contributions off the bench rather
than on it.1 5 However, partly for justifiable reasons 1 6 and partly due

to neglect, the lower courts have simply not received the attention
accorded the Supreme Court and have certainly not received the attention they deserve.
II. BACKGROUND

To understand fully the recent decisions of the Third Circuit
that are the subject of this article, it is necessary to place them in
the context of what the Supreme Court has said and actually
ruled in the past two decades regarding prisoners' rights. This is
true because the Supreme Court is, in the formal structure of the
federal court system, a superior court to the court of appeals,
with both the authority and the opportunity to review Third Circuit decisions and to reverse any decisions the Court decides are
in error. With regard to constitutional adjudication, this is especially true because the Court has come to assume the role, both
real and symbolic, as the ultimate expositor of individual rights
under the Constitution. 1" What follows is a brief review of the
COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1927);

J.

HOWARD, COURTS OF

APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUIT (1981). There have also been a number
of historical studies, including one of the Third Circuit itself. See, e.g., S. PRESSER,
STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
(1982); M. SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT (1970); M. TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS

IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: KENTUCKY, 1789-1816 (1978). In addition, the role of the
lower federal courts, and particularly the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in protecting civil rights after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), has been
the subject of considerable study. See, e.g., J. BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981); J.
PELATSON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961).
14 See, e.g.,
G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILE OF LEADING
AMERICAN JUDGES 251-91 (1976); R. GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: JEROME FRANK'S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW (1985).
15 See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930);J. FRANK, COURTS ON
TRIAL (1949).

16 See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text,
17 See A. Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 373 (1987) Archibald Cox
described the Court as "the ultimate guardian of liberty, equality, and property
against oppression by the Executive and Legislative Branches or by the States."
Cox further argues that the Court has been especially aggressive in this role since
World War II, asserting that this is the predominant theme of the Court's work in
the last forty years. Id. at 177-83. See also H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIARY: THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 95 (7th ed. 1987) ("Whatever
one's individual views may be regarding either the wisdom or the appropriateness
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history of prisoners' rights litigation, with the emphasis on the
key Supreme Court decisions of the past two decades. 8
A.

The Rise and Fall of the "Hands Off" Doctrine

"[L]awful incarceration," noted Justice Murphy in 1948,
"brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many
privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations
underlying our penal system."' 9 For most of the century and a
half or so since Americans began in earnest to build and fill prisons, courts simply refused to hear complaints by inmates that
conditions of their confinement violated their constitutional
rights. In Stroud v. Swope, 2 ' for example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an action by Robert Stroud, better known
as "the Birdman of Alcatraz," challenging a prison regulation
forbidding inmates to transact business. Although Stroud's expansive claim 22 to an "unlimited" right to engage in outside business activities would probably have been rejected no matter who
made it, the Ninth Circuit did not even reach the merits. Instead,
of the Court's role in our democratic society, one thing is clear: the Supreme Court
of the United States is beyond question the great and ultimate defender of the basic
freedoms of the American people.").
18 For a fuller treatment of recent trends in prisoners' rights litigation, see Berger, Withdrawal of Rights and Due Deference: The New Hands-Off Policy in Correctional
Litigation, 47 UMKC L. REV. 1 (1978); Jacob & Sharma, Disciplinary and Punitive
Transfer Decisions and Due Process Values In The American CorrectionalSystem, 12 STETSON
L. REV. 1 (1982); Willens, Structure, Content and the Exigencies of War: American Prison
Law After Twenty-Five Years, 1962-87, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 41 (1987) (an ambitious and
interesting treatment focusing as much on the nature of prison as an institution as
on court decisions).
19 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948). Price was not a case where the
inmate challenged a condition of confinement. At issue was whether the prisoner
would be allowed to leave the institution to argue in person his petition for writ of
habeas corpus. The Court concluded that courts of appeals, within their discretion,
"do have the power ... to issue an order in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus
commanding that a prisoner be brought to the courtroom to argue his own appeal." Id. at 284. However, the Court determined that it was unnecessary to remand the case to the Circuit Court of Appeals to exercise its discretion since the
case was being sent back to the district court for further proceedings. Id. at 286.
20 For one of the best and most interesting studies of the rise of prisons, see D.
ROTHMAN, DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM:

SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW

(1971) (placing the rise of the penitentiary in the context of the creation
of a number of other institutions during the Jacksonian period such as the almshouse and the insane asylum).
21 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951).
22 Stroud compounded his allegation with the charge that the prison regulation,
although it was promulgated in 1931 and applied on its face to all prisoners, was in
fact specifically directed against him, and was thus part of a nearly twenty-year conspiracy against him by the prison administrators. Id. at 850.
REPUBLIC
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the court noted that "it is well settled that it is not the function of
the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries, but only to23 deliver from imprisonment
those who are illegally confined."

This "hands off" doctrine, a refusal to allow inmates their
day in court to complain about unconstitutional conditions of
confinement, was based on the premise that prison administrators were entitled to unfettered discretion in the running of their
institutions.2 4 It also reflected a view of the inmate best summarized by a frequently-quoted decision of the Virginia Court of
Appeals of 187125 that described prisoners as "slaves of the
State" having "not only forfeited [their] liberty but all [their] personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to
[them]."26
23 Id. at 851-52. See also Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330, 331 (10th Cir. 1949)
(court refused to hear challenge to loss of "good time" credits following disciplinary charge, declaring that "[t]he prison system is under the administration of the
Attorney General .. .not the district courts. The court has no power to interfere
with the conduct of the prison or its discipline. It may discharge upon habeas
corpus only where the petitioner is illegally detained.")
Not all courts acquiesced in this abdication. In Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d
443 (6th Cir. 1944), the court reversed the dismissal of the prisoner's petition for
writ of habeas corpus, which alleged, among other things, that while in prison he
had "suffered bodily harm and injuries and was subjected to assaults, cruelties and
indignities from guards and co-inmates." Coffin, 143 F.2d at 444. Ruling that
habeas corpus could be used to challenge an "unlawful restraint of personal liberty" even for a person in lawful custody, the court reasoned:
A prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law. While the
law does take his liberty and imposes a duty of servitude and observance
of discipline for his regulation and that of other prisoners, it does not
deny his right to personal security against unlawful invasion. When a
man possesses a substantial right, the courts will be diligent in finding a
way to protect it. The fact that a person is legally in prison does not
prevent the use of habeas corpus to protect his other inherent rights.

Id. at 445.
24 See, e.g., Willens, supra note 18, at 72. See generally Note, Beyond the Ken of the
Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Prisoners, 72 YALE L. J.
506 (1963).
25 Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790 (1871).
26 Id. at 796. The equating of a prisoner with a slave had at least some basis in
fact because of the rise of the convict lease system in the South immediately following the Civil War. Under that system, the states allowed businessmen and local
authorities to force convicts to work for them in exchange for a fee paid to the state
by the businessman and an agreement to maintain and guard the convict. The convict lease system was not identical to the old system of plantation slavery. It was
one of a number of types of forced labor, including peonage, in the post-bellum
South that owed as much to the economic conditions of the New South as to the
Old South. Still, as Edward Ayers has written, "[o]bviously, the roots of such
forced labor reached into slavery, not only for the work force itself but also for the
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By the 1960s, courts became more receptive to inmates'
claims. Inmates were able to take advantage of a legal system
that was opening up to the poor and other previously unrepresented groups, 27 aided by a new wave of public interest lawyers
for whom inmates were another clientele.28 Courts came to recognize, albeit slowly, that inmates retained at least some rights in
prison; some judges began to entertain suits brought by inmates
alleging that those rights had been violated. 29 Along with this
habits of thought that encouraged employers to turn so readily to such heavyhanded means of securing labor." E. AYERS, VENGEANCE & JUSTICE: CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 191 (1984). See also Cohen,
Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865-1940: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 42 J. OF S.
HIST. 31 (1976).
More is at work in Ruffin than a description of the convict lease system, for the
imagery and rhetoric of slavery endured after emancipation and the ratification of
the thirteenth amendment. It is interesting that such imagery was often used to
express support or compassion for a given segment of society. Thus, radical labor
leaders of the late nineteenth century identified their audiences as "slaves" to the
capitalist "masters" in the labor struggles of the time. One pamphlet prepared by
the anarchist August Spies in 1886, shortly before the Haymarket Square bombing
in Chicago, began "REVENGE! Workingmen to Arms!!! Your masters sent out
their bloodhounds-the police; they killed six of your brothers at McCormicks this
afternoon." It continued, "[y]ou have been miserable and obedient slaves all these
years. Why? To satisfy the insatiable greed, to fill the coffers of your lazy thieving
master?" See P. AVRICH, THE HAYMARKET TRAGEDY 190 (1984). As a second example, prostitution was frequently referred to as "white slavery" by the antiprostitution reformers at the turn of the twentieth century, with obvious sympathy and
solicitude for the women and young girls they perceived as involuntarily lured into
the profession. The Mann Act, passed in 1910, which made it a federal crime to
transport a woman across state lines for "immoral purposes," was directed against
the "white slave traffic." See P. BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN
AMERICA, 1820-1920, 191-204 (1978). For a review of interesting efforts to define
"slavery" and place changing concepts of slavery in historical and cultural perspective, see Soifer, Status, Contract and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE L.J. 1916 (1986); D. B.
DAVIS, SLAVERY AND HUMAN PROGRESS 8-22 (1984); 0. PATrERSON, SLAVERY AND
SOCIAL DEATH (1982).
27 John Hart Ely, for one, has argued that the guiding principle behind the judicial activism of the Warren Court, and that which differentiates it from the activism

of the Lochner era, was a focus not on defining fundamental substantive values, but
on making certain that the political process opened up and remained open for all,
eliminating discrimination against minorities, including "society's habitual unequals." SeeJ. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-75 (1980). See also Cox, supra note
17, at 180.
28 On the renewed interest in public interest law in the 1960s, seeJ. AUERBACH,
UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA
(1976); L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, 677-78 (2d ed. 1985).

280-83

On the
rise of law school legal clinics addressing prisoners' legal needs and rights, see
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 495-96 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); Jacob &
Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prisoner's Need for Legal Services in the Criminal Correctional
Process, 18 U. KAN. L. REV. 493 (1970).
29 For a brief overview of the period at the very beginning of this time of transi-
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new sensitivity to the rights of inmates came a new focus within
the institutions on rehabilitation, which provided its own impetus
and even justification for recognizing the rights of prisoners. °
B.

Prisoners' Rights Litigation In the Supreme Court: The Early Cases

The retreat from the "hands off" doctrine was led at first by
lower federal courts3 ' and commentators. 32 The Supreme
Court's initial forays into the field were tentative. In Cooper v.
Pate,3 3 the Court, in a brief, one-paragraph per curiam opinion
reversed the dismissal of an inmate's claim that he was denied the
opportunity to purchase certain items and denied other privileges accorded other inmates because of his religious beliefs.
The Court set forth no guiding principles on the rights of those
incarcerated, nor did it acknowledge that its decision was inconsistent with the "hands off" policy that had dominated for so
long. 4 The Court stated modestly that "[tlaking as true the allegations of the complaint, as they must be on a motion to dismiss,
the complaint stated a cause of action and it was error to dismiss
it. 13 5 In support of this proposition, the Court relied on two
lower court decisions, one from the Second Circuit and one from
the Fourth Circuit.3 6 Four years later, in the last term of the
Warren era, the Court, again in a one-paragraph per curiam
opinion, upheld a lower court decision striking down an Alabama
statute that required state prisons to be racially segregated.3 7 In
a concurring opinion, Justice Black stated that such segregation
could be justified if necessitated by security concerns within the
tion, see Note, ConstitutionalRights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
985 (1962).
30 Willens, supra note 18, at 83-84.
31 For example, both the issues of censorship of prisoner mail and religious discrimination were considered by lower federal courts significantly before those issues were addressed by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d
233 (2d Cir. 1961) (recognizing right to be free of discrimination based on religion); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970) (recognizing first
amendment implications of censorship of prisoners mail). See generally Note, supra
note 29.
32 See Hirschkopf & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REV.
795 (1969); Note, supra note 29.
33 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
34 The Seventh Circuit, in affirming the dismissal of the inmate's complaint, had
made clear that it was relying on the "hands off" doctrine. Cooper v. Pate, 324
F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
35 Cooper, 378 U.S. at 546.
36 Id. (citing Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961); Sewell v. Pegelow,
291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961)).
37 Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
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institution. 8
The Court gave a somewhat fuller treatment to the claim of a
Tennessee prisoner during the next term inJohnson v. Avery. 3 9 In
Johnson, the Court struck down as a denial of inmates' right of
access to the courts, a Tennessee prison regulation which stated
that "[n]o inmate will advise, assist or otherwise contract to aid
another, either with or without a fee, to prepare Writs or other
legal matters."' 40 State officials sought to justify the regulation
based on concerns of security and discipline. Even though the
Court appeared to concede that there was some merit to the official concerns,4 ' the Court gave them surprisingly short shrift:
There is no doubt that discipline and administration of state
detention facilities are state functions. They are subject to
federal authority only where paramount federal constitutional
or statutory rights supervene. It is clear, however, that in instances where state regulations applicable to inmates of prison
facilities conflict with such rights, the regulations may be
invalidated .42

The Court's main objection to the regulation was that it interfered
with the right of inmates to petition for a writ of habeas corpus (as
opposed to raising challenges to conditions of confinement), especially for illiterate or poorly educated inmates.4 3 In this regard, the
decision in Johnson is not much of a departure; even at the height of
the "hands off" doctrine, courts recognized that inmates had a right
of access to courts to challenge the legality of their confinements. 4 4
Prison officials could prohibit "writ writers" if alternatives existed to
ensure the inmates' access to the courts, but the Court seemed to
suggest that the burden was on the officials to demonstrate the
availability and effectiveness of such alternatives. 4 5
In his dissent in Johnson, Justice White joined by Justice Black,
gave more weight to the administrators' fears of disciplinary and se38 Id. at 334 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black sought "to make explicit ...
that prison authorities have the right, acting in good faith and in particularized
circumstances, to take into account racial tensions in maintaining security, discipline, and good order in prisons and jails." Id.

39

393 U.S. 483 (1969).

Id. at 484.
See id. at 488. "It is indisputable that prison 'writ writers' like petitioner are
sometimes a menace to prison discipline and that their petitions are often so unskillful as to be a burden on the courts which receive them." Id.
42 Id. at 486.
43 Id. at 487.
44 See Exparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941). See also supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
45 Johnson, 393 U.S. at 489-90.
40
41
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curity problems posed byjailhouse lawyers. 4 6 Nevertheless, the dissenters were sympathetic to the plight of poorly-educated inmates
trying to petition courts; in fact, Justice White suggested that it was
precisely the poor quality of service provided by jailhouse lawyers
that justified the regulation. Justice White argued that prisoners'
right of access to the courts should be secured by more effective and
carefully controlled alternatives. 4 7
For the next few years after Johnson, Supreme Court cases involving prisoners' rights followed the same pattern: there was a recognition generally that inmates had rights, and that their complaints
in given actions might state valid claims, but the court offered no
elaboration of the parameters of those rights, or whether the exercise of such rights must change in a prison setting. For example, the
Court recognized that inmates enjoyed some first amendment rights
in Cruz v. Hauck 48 and Younger v. Gilmore.4 9 Moreover, in Cruz v.
Beto, 5" the Court endorsed the view that prisoners had at least some
right to the free exercise of religion. However, in none of the cases
did the Court spell out the content of those rights or even reach the
merits of the prisoners' suits. 5 '
C.

The October 1973 Term

The October 1973 term marked something of a turning
point. In that year, the Supreme Court made its grand entrance
into the field of prisoners' rights with a trilogy of decisions. The
cases represented the first effort by the Court to discuss prisoners' rights in depth, not only to identify specific rights retained by
inmates, but also to set out some general guiding principles. In
so doing, the Court accorded the subject the type of attention
and a degree of analysis that such cases had simply not received
up to that point.
The first of these cases was Procunier v. Martinez,5 2 decided in
April. At issue in Martinez were a series of regulations governing
prisoners' mail. Operating on the premise that "personal correspondence by prisoners is 'a privilege, not a right,' -5 the regulaId. at 499 (White, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 501.-02 (White, J., dissenting).
46
48

404 U.S. 59 (1971).

49 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
50 405 U.S. 319 (1972).

52

See Calhoun, The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: A ReapHASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219, 222 n. 14 (1977).
416 U.S. 396 (1974).

53

Id. at 399 (citations omitted).

51

praisal, 4
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tions at issue gave prison officials nearly unfettered authority to
censor inmate mail. One rule prohibited inmates from writing
letters in which they "unduly complain" or "magnify grievances"
about the prison. 54 Another rule defined "contraband" to include writings " 'expressing inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views or beliefs.' "5 Yet another rule forbade
inmates from sending or receiving letters " 'that pertain to criminal activity; are lewd, obscene, or defamatory; contain foreign
matter, or are otherwise inappropriate.' "56 The regulations allowed prison officials to screen inmate mail and to take any one
of a number of steps if they found an offending letter, from refusing to deliver the letter to issuing a disciplinary charge to the
inmate.5 7 A three-judge panel of the United States District Court
ruled that the regulations were invalid and the Supreme Court
affirmed.
The Court began by confronting directly for the first time
and rejecting the traditional "hands off" approach that had governed prisoners' rights litigation. Justice Powell, writing for the
Court, conceded the difficulty in running correctional institutions: "Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons in America
are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not
readily susceptible of resolution by decree. . . .[C]ourts are ill
equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison
administration and reform."5 " "But," he continued,
a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to
take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising
in a federal or state institution. When a prison regulation or
practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional
rights .
Having gone that far, the Court declined the opportunity to delineate the scope of first amendment rights for those who are incarcerated. Instead, because the rights of inmates to send and receive
mail are "inextricably meshed" with the rights of persons outside
the institution with whom they would communicate, the Court chose
to decide the case on what it termed the "narrower" grounds of how
the censorship of prisoners' mail violated the first amendment rights
54 Id.
55

Id (citation omitted).

56 Id. at 399-400 (citation omitted).

Id. at 400.
Id. at 404-05.
59 Id. at 405-06 (citingJohnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969)).
57
58
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of those not incarcerated. 6' The Court reviewed the various standards that had been applied by the lower federal courts to the problem of censorship of prisoners' mail. 6' The Court then looked to its
own prior decisions interpreting the first amendment in various settings in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,6 2
Healy v. James,63 and United States v. O'Brien64 for the appropriate
standard. After balancing the State's interest in maintaining the security of the institution against the first amendment interests at
stake, the Court decided that some censorship of prisoners' mail
might be justified (for example, the refusal to deliver mail containing escape plans) but only when the following criteria are met:
First, the regulation or practice in question must further an
important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to
the suppression of expression

....

Second, the limitation of

First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved. 6 5
Justice Powell made clear that officials could not "censor inmate
correspondence simply to eliminate unflattering or unwelcome
opinions or factually inaccurate statements." '6 6 Employing that standard, the Court had little trouble invalidating the regulations at issue as sweeping too broadly. In addition, the Court held that the
prison had to establish procedural protections to notify an inmate
when a letter written by him or addressed to him was being held by
officials. This would provide the inmate with "a reasonable opportunity to protest that decision," and provide a way to have the ultimate decision made by someone other than the person who
originally seized the letter.6 7
Justices Marshall and Brennan concurred, but stated that they
60 Id. at 408.
61 Lower court

decisions had ranged from application of the "hands off" approach, through a requirement that the system of regulation be "rational," to an
insistence that prison officials demonstrate a "compelling state interest" to justify
restrictions. Compare McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964) with Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
62 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (striking down a high school regulation banning the
wearing of black armbands to protest the Vietnam conflict).
63 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (striking down the actions of state college officials who
refused to give official recognition to local chapter of Studentsfor a DemocraticSociety).
64 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding application of a statute prohibiting destruction of draft registration cards to someone who burnt draft card in protest of the
Vietnam conflict).
65 Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 418.
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would have decided the case based on the first amendment rights of
the prisoners. "A prisoner," Justice Marshall asserted, "does not
shed such basic First Amendment rights at the prison gate. '"68 Justice Marshall concluded his opinion with a stirring explication of the
first amendment's importance to those incarcerated:
When the prison gates slam behind an inmate, he does not
lose his human quality; his mind does not become closed to
ideas; his intellect does not cease to feed on a free and open
interchange of opinions; his yearning for self-respect does not
end; nor is his quest for self-realization concluded. If anything, the needs for identity and self-respect are more compelling in the dehumanizing prison environment. Whether an 0.
Henry writing his short stories in a jail cell or a frightened
young inmate writing his family, a prisoner needs a medium
for self-expression. It is the role of the First Amendment and
this Court to protect those precious personal rights6 9by which
we satisfy such basic yearnings of the human spirit.

This paean to the importance of the first amendment interests at
stake ironically did not really change the analysis; Justice Marshall
indicated that he would employ the same standard to evaluate the
restrictions as Justice Powell had set forth in the majority opinion.7y
Two months later in Pell v. Procunier,7 ' the second of the three
cases, the Court was asked to decide the constitutionality of a prison
regulation that prohibited face-to-face interviews between members
of the media and inmates specifically selected by the journalists.
This time the Court upheld the regulation in an opinion handed
down near the end of the term. However, because the lower court
had struck down the regulation as a violation of the rights of the
inmates, as opposed to the press, the Court was forced to confront
the issue left undecided in Martinez of whether prisoners retained
first amendment rights in prison.
The Court ruled that they did. After quoting Justice Murphy's
observation in an earlier case in which he declared that "incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many
privileges," ' 72 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated that,
"[i]n the First Amendment context a corollary of this principle is
that a prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are
not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate
68 Id. at 422 (Marshall, J., concurring).
69 Id. at 428 (Marshall, J., concurring).
70 Id. at 423-24 & n.4 (Marshall, J., concurring).
71 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
72 Id. at 822 (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)).
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penological objectives of the corrections system." 7 3
The Court held that challenges to practices that infringe upon
prisoners' first amendment rights must be assessed in light of "legitimate penological objectives." Justice Stewart delineated four such
objectives: deterrence, protection of society, rehabilitation and security.7 4 The Court then upheld the regulations, noting the special
security problems posed by actual visits to the institution from those
outside.
Justice Stewart's analysis drew heavily on non-prison precedents, even though the rights at issue were those of the inmates.
Relying in part on cases analyzing "time, place and manner" restrictions on the freedom of speech in non-prison settings, 75 the Court
stressed that the regulation operated in a content-neutral fashion7 6
and that alternative channels of communication existed-including
use of the mails, the ability to communicate through family, friends
or attorneys whose opportunity to visit was not curtailed, and the
availability of random "conversations" between the prison population and visiting members of the media. 77 Nonetheless, Justice
Stewart made clear that the Court was mindful that it was deciding a
case involving a prison setting:
We would find the availability of such alternatives [avenues of communication] unimpressive if they were submitted
as justification for governmental restriction of personal communication among members of the general public. We have
recognized, however, that "[t]he relationship of state prisoners and the state officers who supervise their confinement is
far more intimate than that of a State and a private citizen,"
and that the "internal problems of state prisons involve is73
74

Id.
Id. at

822-23.

Id. at 826 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)).
76 While neutral on its face, the regulation may not in fact be as content neutral
as the Court suggested. It may make sense to label as "content neutral" a regulation that limits use of a soapbox in Central Park, given the wide range of the interests of the various types of persons who might use it. However, the same is not
necessarily true in the prison setting. I doubt the Court would have gone out on a
limb if it had assumed that inmates and members of the media generally seek each
other out to talk about one of two subjects: the inmate's case that landed him in
prison or conditions in the facility. If that is the case, the regulation at issue in Pell
begins to look significantly more like the blatantly content specific regulations
struck down in Martinez, except that it sweeps even more broadly, a feature that
should render the regulation even more objectionable under standard first amend75

ment analysis, instead of saving it.
77 Pell, 417 U.S. at 827-28.
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As in Martinez, members of the media also objected to the regulation as a violation of their rights.7 9 Unlike the earlier case, however, the fact that the restrictions again directly affected persons
outside the institution did not change the result. The Court found
that the regulation was not "part of an attempt by the State to conceal the conditions in its prisons," and noted that, under the regulation, the press was relegated to the same right of access to the
institution as the general public."0 Again relying on a non-prison
precedent, Branzburg v. Hayes,"' the Court rejected the view that the
first amendment gave the media any right of special access to the
institution and its prisoners.8 2
Justice Powell, joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan, in dissent, made little mention of the prison setting of the case, but made
much of the underlying values of the first amendment which he perceived as being threatened by the majority decision. "What is at
stake here," asserted Justice Powell, "is the societal function of the
First Amendment in preserving free public discussion of governmental affairs." ' 3 Justice Powell cited the findings of the district
court that the ban on interviews did in fact affect the quality and
accuracy of news reporting about the institution. Justice Powell asserted that the heavier burden of justification set forth in Martinez
should govern this case as well. 4 Justice Powell found the total ban
to be unnecessarily broad; he would have struck the balance somewhere between the absolute ban on press interviews required by the
regulations and upheld by the majority, and the case-by-case evaluation of interview requests the lower court had mandated. Justice
78

Id. at 825-26 (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973)).

The plaintiffs who were members of the press, argued that the regulation had
to be evaluated under the "clear and present danger" test because of its effect on
them. Id. at 829. The Court, however, rejected this contention. Id. at 834.
80 Id. at 830. The effect of the regulation was to limit persons who could visit
with an inmate to those with whom the inmate had a special relationship, such as
his family or attorneys. Id.
79

81 408 U.S. 665 (1972).

82 Pell, 417 U.S. at 834-35. In Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843
(1974), a companion case to Pell, the Court applied the same reasoning as was
adopted in Pell. In so doing, the Saxbe Court rejected a challenge to a regulation

promulgated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons which prohibited face-to-face interviews between the media and inmates. Id. at 850.
Pell, 417 U.S. at 862 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 865-66 (Powell, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Powell noted that
Martinez required prison officials to demonstrate that the regulations further a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of expression and that no
less restrictive alternative would serve that interest. Id. at 866 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
83
84
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Powell stood ready to accept a policy that set forth "reasonable
time, place and manner restrictions" on interviews, including a limit
on the number of interviews any one inmate could have over a given
time period.8 5
The decision in Wolff v. McDonnell,8 6 the last of the term's three
prisoners' rights cases, was handed down two days after Pell. The
main issues in Wolff were whether an inmate about to lose "good
time '"87 credits was entitled to some procedural due process protection before the credits were taken away, and, if so, what were those
procedural protections.8 8 Two years earlier, in Morrissey v. Brewer,8 9
the Court had held that a person faced with revocation of parole was
entitled to a hearing, with written notice of the reason for the revocation, disclosure of the evidence against him, a right to call witnesses and present evidence, a right to confront adverse witnesses, a
right to a neutral and detached finder of fact, and a right to a statement of reasons for the decision."0 In Wolff, the Court similarly held
that at least some process was due those threatened with the loss of
"good time."
The Court again began with a confrontation and rejection of
the "hands off" doctrine with what was to become one of its most
85 Id. at 873 (Powell, J., dissenting). The reason Justice Powell would have allowed limits on the number of interviews with any particular inmate-and one of
the main fears of prison officials and administrators that prompted the regulations
at issue-was what came to be known in the course of the litigation as the "big
wheel" phenomenon: the belief by administrators that repeated press interviews
with selected inmate leaders tended to enhance their standing and influence among
other prisoners and enabled them to spur the other prisoners on to acts of violence.
Id. at 866 (Powell, J., dissenting).
86 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
87 "Good time" credits, also known as commutation time, reduce an inmate's
prison sentence by taking time off his or her sentence for days or months served
without serious disciplinary infraction.
88 The litigation raised two other issues. First, the Court held that allowing
prison officials to open mail addressed to prisoners from their attorneys and to
inspect that mail for contraband did not violate the inmates' rights as long as the
mail was opened in their presence and was not read. Id. at 574-77. Second, the
Court considered a regulation by which the warden appointed one specific inmate
legal advisor to assist inmates in filing legal challenges and that further prohibited
inmates fiom seeking the advice of other inmates on legal matters without the permission of the warden. The Court agreed with the court of appeals that a remand
was necessary to develop a record from which it could be determined whether the
appointed legal advisor could handle the work load. In the course of its ruling,
however, the Court rejected the argument that the requirement to provide legal
assistance set forth in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), applied only to
habeas corpus petitions and not to civil rights actions challenging conditions of
confinement. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 577-80.
89 408 U.S. 471 (1972).

90 Id. at 489.
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frequently quoted passages: -[T]hough his rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment,
a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when
he is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between
the Constitution and the prisons of this country."" However, after
listing prior decisions recognizing various rights retained in prison
the Court stepped back and stated:
Of course, as we have indicated, the fact that prisoners retain
rights under the Due Process Clause in no way implies that
these rights are not subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime to which they have been lawfully committed. Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal
prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in
such proceedings does not apply. In sum, there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the9 2provisions of the Constitution that are of general
application.

As noted, the Court held that the threatened loss of "good time"
did implicate the right to procedural due process retained by prisoners. Although the Court did not find that right in the Constitution itself, it instead based it on an entitlement to a "liberty interest"
created by statute,9 3 analogous to statutorily-created "property interests" recognized by the Court in Board of Regents v. Roth. 94 As to
418 U.S. at 555-56.
Id. at 556 (citations omitted).
93 Id. at 556-57.
94 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Ironically, the Court in Io/ff defined the new "liberty
interest" in a passage in which it responded to and rejected the State's argument
that prisoners had no due process rights whatsoever with regard to prison disciplinary hearings. This left the impression that this new approach to "liberty" served
to clear a constitutional hurdle and expand prisoners' rights:
We also reject the assertion of the State that whatever may be true
of the Due Process Clause in general or of other rights protected by that
Clause against state infringement, the interest of prisoners in disciplinary procedures is not included in that "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. It is true that the Constitution itself does not
guarantee good-time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison. ...
But the State having created the right to good time and itself recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major misconduct,
the prisoner's interest has real substance and is sufficiently embraced
within Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by
the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556-57. Grounding the right in a state statute and not the Constitution, however, left the right vulnerable, as later cases demonstrated. See infra
notes 112-18 and accompanying text. For a critique of the extension of the concept
of statutorily-created "property" interests to "liberty" under the due process
91 Woff,
92
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the procedures required, the majority held that the "mutual accommodation" between the rights of the prisoners and the interests of
the institution mandated that prisoners would receive written notice
of the charge at least twenty-four hours before the hearing and that
the hearing must take place before a neutral and detached hearing
officer. Additionally, the prisoner must receive a written statement
as well as the evidence relied upon
of the reasons for the 9decision,
5
by the hearing officer.

Whether to allow prisoners to call witnesses presented a more
difficult problem. "We are also of the opinion," Justice White wrote
for the majority, "that the inmate facing disciplinary proceedings
should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be un96
duly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals."
Noting however, that "[t]he operation of a correctional institution is
at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking," 9 7 the Court refused
to make the right anything more than extremely contingent. The
Court ruled that "[p]rison officials must have the necessary discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable limits and to refuse to
call witnesses that may create a risk of reprisal or undermine authority, as well as to limit access to other inmates to collect statements or
to compile other documentary evidence." 9 8 For similar reasons, the
Court refused to give prisoners the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, noting that the risk of retaliation created
even greater security risks. 9 9 Finally, the court refused to extend
prisoners the right to counsel in disciplinary hearings, partly because of the delay such a right would cause, but also because "[t]he
insertion of counsel into the disciplinary process would inevitably
give the proceedings a more adversary cast and tend to reduce their
utility as a means to further correctional goals."' ' 0 The Court declared, however, that an inmate should have a "counsel substitute"
if he is illiterate or if the hearing presents especially complex isclause, see Herman, The New Liberty: The ProceduralDue Process Rights of Prisoners and
Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U.L. REV. 482 (1984).
95 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-64.
96

97
98
99
100

Id. at 566.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 567-69.
Id. at 570. It is probably news to most inmates that prison disciplinary hearings-a procedure that can land them in solitary confinement or some other restricted custody housing for extended periods of time and can result in additional
months if not years in prison-are not adversarial, but are supposed to be
therapeutic.
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sues.'' The Court acknowledged that the procedures required
were not as extensive as those set forth in Morrissey, but stated that
its position was not "graven in stone" and indicated a willingness to
reexamine its holding in the future. 0 2
In separate dissenting opinions, Justices Douglas and Marshall
joined by Justice Brennan objected strongly to the Court's refusal to
provide prisoners with the right to call witnesses, the right of confrontation and the right to counsel.' 0 3
Martinez, Pell and Wo/ffare important because of both the rights
accorded inmates and the manner in which the Court reached the
decisions. From a substantive point of view, the cases produced
mixed results to be sure. The decisions certainly did not go as far as
many advocating inmates' rights would have liked. 0 4 The decision
in Martinez, for example, did not even turn on the scope of the rights
of the prisoners, an issue that was expressly reserved.'0 5 Moreover,
in Pell the Court upheld the regulation, although it expressly recognized that inmates enjoyed some first amendment rights in prison.
Similarly, Woff accorded some procedural protections but passed on
other rights such as the right to confrontation and the right to counsel that, in other contexts, the Court has recognized as essential to
the fairness of hearings. 10 6 Even more fundamental, by grounding
101 Id.
102 Id. at 571-72. The Court attempted to distinguish Morrissey by noting that
while "unquestionably a matter of considerable importance," the loss of good time
is not the "immediate disaster" for an inmate that loss of parole is for the parolee.
Rather, the Court noted that the loss of parole works an immediate and certain loss
of liberty, but loss of good time "does not then and there work any change in the
conditions in his liberty" and, in the view of the Court, may not affect parole or
extend the amount of time served. Id. at 561. On the other hand, the Court noted,
parole revocation hearings do not implicate security concerns other than those
raised in a normal criminal trial, whereas prison disciplinary hearings "take place in
a closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to violate the criminal law and who have been lawfully incarcerated for doing so." Id. at
561.
103 Id. at 580 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 593 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
104 See, e.g., Calhoun, supra note 51.
105 This may be more apparent in hindsight. Some lower courts applied the
stricter Martinez standard in cases after 1974 in situations which involved questions
of the scope of prisoners' rights and in which the rights of those outside the institution were not implicated. See Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir.
1985); Morgan v. LaVallee, 526 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1975). It was not until the
Supreme Court's decision in Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987) that the Court
made clear that Martinez dealt only with the rights of those outside the institution.
Id. at 2260.
106 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (right to confrontation and crossexamination essential to accuracy of determination and fairness of hearing); Greene
v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (same); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (recognizing importance of right to counsel).
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the right to due process in a state statute rather than the Constitution, the Court, theoretically at least, made it easy for a state to take
away even the limited procedural protections accorded by the
Court's decision. This would ultimately prove to be an inadequate
hedge against arbitrary governmental action that is supposed to be
the rationale for procedural protections in the first place.
Nonetheless, the 1974 trilogy represents significant gains for
prisoners and those working in the area of prisoners' rights litigation. The precise contours of the rights of inmates recognized by
the Court may appear to be modest compared to rights enjoyed by
persons outside prisons. Still, the introduction of due process into
the institutions and the prohibition of wholesale censorship of inmates by prison officials, especially with regard to communications
that criticize or embarrass the administration, represent real gains
and give prisoners' rights protection from the arbitrariness of 0offi7
cials' actions that were simply unheard of twenty years earlier.'
Moreover, an assessment of the gains made in constitutional
adjudication by a group that has been barred from the process for
so long is more than a matter of counting wins and losses. More
importantly, the manner in which the Court reached its decisions is
at least as significant as the holdings in many cases and it is here that
the opinions made their greatest contribution. For the first time,
the Court squarely addressed the "hands off" doctrine and rejected
it, often in strong language. In addition, although in each opinion
the prison setting justified an accommodation in the exercise of constitutional rights that would not have been made for persons outside
the institution, the opinions also contain language which recognizes
broadly that inmates retain rights in prison. Finally, the frequent
reliance on non-prison precedents suggested that inmates might be
entering the constitutional mainstream. Prisoners had not secured
the right to "equal treatment," but appeared to be moving toward
"treatment as an equal."' 0 8 Inmates were not yet full constitutional
107

See Hirschkopf & Millemann, supra note 32.

272-78 (1977). Professor Dworkin explained the difference between the two claims to equality as follows:
Citizens governed by the liberal conception of equality each have a right
to equal concern and respect. But there are two different rights that
might be comprehended by that abstract right. The first is the right to
equal treatment, that is, to the same distribution of good or opportunities as anyone else has or is given.... The second is the right to treatment as an equal. This is the right, not to an equal distribution of some
good or opportunity, but the right to equal concern and respect in the
political decision about how these goods and opportunities are to be
distributed.
108 R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
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beings, but the trilogy was a beginning.
D.

The Retreat

The Supreme Court giveth and it taketh away; what appeared to be a beginning comes to look in retrospect more like
an end. Almost immediately after Wolff, the Court began to retreat from an expansion of the rights of inmates and to renew its
devotion to deference to the expertise and judgment of prison
officials in running their institutions-a retreat that has come
very close to a return to the "hands off" doctrine.1 0 9 As one veteran of prisoners rights litigation has summarized the period after Wof.
[B]eginning in the last half of the 1970s, the Burger-Rehnquist
Court has moved us, though not full circle back to the slave-ofthe-state era, two-thirds of the way back ....

In a series of

cases beginning in 1976, we began to see a return to the
"hands off" doctrine with language about a "wide spectrum of
discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business
of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts,"
and to the effect that "the day-to-day functioning of state prisons" involves "issues and discretionary decisions that are not
the business of federal judges."1 1 0
The retreat was signalled first by a series of decisions involving
the right to procedural due process. In Meachum v. Fano,'" the
Court held that the administrative transfer of an inmate to another
institution in the state prison system, even one with significantly
harsher living conditions, did not implicate the fourteenth amendment absent a statute creating a "liberty" interest as was found in
Wolff. The Court stressed the deference that is due the decisions of
administrators in running institutions.' 1 2 Just as important, the
Court explained the limited role the Constitution and the federal
courts must play in evaluating challenges to such transfers:
The Constitution does not require that the State have more
than one prison for convicted felons; nor does it guarantee
that the convicted prisoner will be placed in any particular
prison if, as is likely, the State has more than one correctional
institution. The initial decision to assign the convict to a parId. at 273.

See WILLENS, supra note 18, at 113-34; BERGER, supra note 18, at 1-2.
110 Bronstein, CriminalJustice:Prison and Penology, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS 222
109

(N. Dorsen ed. 1984) (quoting Meachum v. Feno, 427 U.S. 215, 225-29 (1976)).
'''
427 U.S. 215 (1976).
112 See id.at 225.
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ticular institution is not subject to audit under the Due Process
Clause, although the degree of confinement in one prison may
be quite different from that in another. The conviction has
sufficiently extinguished the defendant's liberty interest to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons." 3
The Court pointed out that simply because "life in one prison is
much more disagreeable than in another does not in itself signify
that a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest is implicated when a
prisoner is transferred to the institution with the more severe
rules."' 14
In a companion case handed down the same day, Montanye v.
Haymes," 5 the Court made clear that its decision and analysis in
Meachum applied even if the transfer were undertaken for disciplinary, as opposed to administrative, reasons." 6 Again, in ruling
against inmate Haymes the Court used the positivist approach, first
developed in Wolff, to further the prisoners' claims. The Court
noted that under state law, Haymes "had no right to remain at any
particular prison facility and no justifiable expectation that he would
not be transferred unless found guilty of misconduct."" ' 7
Seven years later, in Olim v. Wakinekona,' 8 the Court extended
Meachum to its logical extreme when it held that a prisoner who was
transferred 4,000 miles, from a prison in Hawaii to a prison in California, was not entitled to any procedural protection under the due
process clause in order to challenge his interstate transfer." 9 The
Court arrived at its decision, regardless of the fact that, as the State
conceded, the transfer effectively deprived the inmate of all contact
with family and friends.
The Court's change in attitude is illustrated even more strik113

114

115
116
117

Id. at 224 (emphasis in the original).
Id. at 225.

427 U.S. 236 (1976).
Id. at 242.
Id. at 243. The reasons for Haymes's transfer stemmed from his effort to

circulate a petition to a federal judge. In the petition, Haymes and a number of

other prisoners complained about being denied access to adequate legal assistance
in the institution by virtue of Haymes's having been removed from the prison law
library. Id. at 239. The majority did not attach any particular significance to that
fact but Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan in dissent
and the Second Circuit on remand were willing to allow Haymes to prove that his
transfer was part of an effort to retaliate against him for attempting to exercise his
rights. See id. at 244 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Montanye v. Haymes, 547 F.2d 188
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967 (1977).
118 461 U.S. 238 (1983). For a discussion of Olim as an extension of Meachum, see
Herman, supra note 94, at 519-21.
119 Olim, 461 U.S. at 251.
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ingly in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. 120 At issue
in Jones was a set of regulations that prohibited inmates from soliciting other inmates for union membership, barred meetings of the
union and prohibited bulk mailings to inmates on behalf of the
union. The lower federal court struck down the regulations as a violation of the inmates' first amendment rights and as a violation of
the guarantee of equal protection. On appeal, the Supreme Court
2
reversed. '

Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that, while it
is true that inmates retain first amendment rights not inconsistent
with their status as prisoners, the associational freedoms of the first
amendment are the first to be forfeited once an inmate is inside the
institution.' 2 2 Although the lower court had found that the formation of the union did not pose an immediate threat of violence or
disruption, the majority accepted the prison officials assessment that
"the concept of a prisoners' labor union was itself fraught with potential dangers." 2 3 More importantly, because the views of the administrators were "sincerely held" and "arguably correct," Justice
Rehnquist stated that the officials had met their burden ofjustifying
the regulations; it was incumbent upon the inmates to demonstrate
by "substantial evidence" that the officials had exaggerated their response to the dangers posed by the union.' 2 4 The Court again
stressed the deference that was to be accorded prison officials in
running their institutions 12 5 and upheld the regulations because
they were "rationally related to the reasonable, indeed to the cen'
tral, objectives of prison administration." 126
In the majority's view, "[t]he invocation of the First Amendment, whether the asserted rights are speech or associational, does
not change this analysis."''

27

Justice Rehnquist discussed the inter-

ests of the administrators in controlling prisoners, without any mention of the corresponding interest of the inmates in the exercise of
their first amendment rights. In doing so, he began with a subtle
but important change in the language of prior decisions:
433 U.S. 119 (1977).
Id. at 136.
Id. at 125-26.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 128.
For example, at one point Justice Rehnquist wrote, that "[b]ecause the realities of running a penal institution are complex and difficult, we have also recognized the wide-ranging deference to be accorded the decisions of prison
administrators." Id. at 126.
126 Id. at 129.
127 Id.
120
121
122
123
124
125
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In a prison context, an inmate does not retain those First
Amendment rights that are "inconsistent with his status as a
prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the
corrections system." Prisons, it is obvious, differ in numerous
respects from free society. They, to begin with, are populated,
involuntarily, by people who have been found to have violated
one or more of the criminal laws established by society for its
orderly governance. In seeking a "mutual accommodation between the institutional needs and objectives [of prisons] and
the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application," this Court has repeatedly recognized the need for major
restrictions on a prisoner's rights.' 2 8
Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented. Objecting to the majority's "wholesale abandonment of traditional principles of First
Amendment analysis," 129 Justice Marshall found the regulations unjustified because of the lack of proof that the prisoners' union had
been a disruptive force in the institution. 30 Justice Marshall complained further that,
[i]f the mode of analysis adopted in today's decision were
to be generally followed, prisoners eventually would be
stripped of all constitutional rights, and would retain only
those privileges that prison officials, in their "informed discretion," deigned to recognize. The sole constitutional constraint on prison officials would be a requirement that they act
rationally. Ironically, prisoners would be left with a right of
access to the courts,
but no substantive rights to assert once
3
they got there.' '

Justice Marshall noted the recent rejection of the "hands off" doctrine by federal courts and argued that the decision in Jones represented an abandonment of the approach taken in recent cases:
Today, however, the Court, in apparent fear of a prison reform organization that has the temerity to call itself a "union,"
takes a giant step backwards toward that discredited conception of prisoners' rights and the role of the courts. I decline to
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 141 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 144-47 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Precisely how far the dissent was from
the majority, philosophically at least, is illustrated by Justice Marshall's comment
128
129

that even if the union posed a greater danger than the evidence suggested, the
absolute ban on union meetings would still be unconstitutional: "The central lesson of over half a century of First Amendment adjudication is that freedom is sometimes a hazardous enterprise, and that the Constitution requires the State to bear
certain risks to preserve our liberty." Id. at 146 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
131 Id. at 147 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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join in what I hope will prove to be a temporary retreat.'3 2
With the Court's decision in 1979 of Bell v. Wolftsh, ' the evidence of renewed skepticism, if not hostility, toward complaints by
inmates of unconstitutional conditions was unmistakable. In Bell,
pre-trial detainees challenged the practice of double-bunking at the
Metropolitan Corrections Center in Manhattan, as well as a number
of other practices-including preventing inmates from receiving
hardcover books unless they came directly from the publisher or a
book club, prohibiting the receipt of food packages except at Christmas, unannounced cell searches, and visual body-cavity searches.
The institution justified these practices on security grounds. The
lower federal court had held that because the case involved the
rights of those who had not yet been convicted of crimes, such restrictions could be justified only by a "compelling necessity" and on
that basis, invalidated the challenged practices. 134
The Supreme Court reversed. In another opinion written by
Justice Rehnquist, the majority began by rejecting the notion that
the presumption of innocence that applies to the impending criminal cases of pre-trial detainees plays any role in an evaluation of the
conditions of confinement.' 3 5 Instead, the Court stated that since a
pre-trial detainee has the right under the due process clause to be
free from punishment without due process of law, the validity of the
practices turned on whether "the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other
legitimate governmental purpose."'' 3 6 The Court then set forth a
test that, like the analysis in Jones, limited the Court's inquiry to the
reasonableness of the practice:
Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part
of detention facility officials, that determination generally will
turn on "whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable [for it] ......
Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to "punishment."
Id. at 139 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
134 Id. at 527-30 (citations omitted).
135 Id. at 532-33. The Court also rejected the argument that the only justifiable
basis for conditions of confinement imposed on pre-trial detainees was to ensure
their appearance at trial. In this way, Justice Rehnquist made clear that the legitimate penological objectives, including security, recognized in prior cases, could
justify conditions and restrictions for pre~trial detainees as well as those already
convicted. Id. at 539-40.
136 Id. at 538.
132
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Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal-if it is arbitrary or purposeless-a
court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be
inflicted upon detainees qua detainees."'
Based on that standard, the Court had little trouble holding that the
double-bunking did not amount to punishment and did not violate
any constitutional rights of the inmates. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist
noted that, there is no " 'one man, one cell' principle lurking in the
3 8
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."'
As for the other regulations, Justice Rehnquist again set forth
the guiding principle that "convicted prisoners do not forfeit all
constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison," 139 but their rights are subject to restrictions in furtherance of legitimate correctional goals, including security.
Moreover, the Court again stressed the "wide ranging deference"

afforded prison officials in adopting and carrying out policies to run
their institutions, "not merely because the administrator ordinarily
will . . .have a better grasp of his domain than the reviewing judge,
but also because the operation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our
Government, not the Judicial."' 4 0 Justice Rehnquist easily found
the "publisher only" rule, the restriction of food packages and the
practice of unannounced cell searches, to be "rational" and therefore constitutional. Even the practice of visual body-cavity searches
Id. at 538-39 (citations omitted).
Id. at 542. Justice Rehnquist's effort at a humorous takeoff on the famous
"one man, one vote" principle from Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), is reminiscent of a remark made two years later in Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312 (1981). In
Atiyeh, in hearing an application as CircuitJustice, he stayed an order of the District
Court of Oregon requiring prison officials to take immediate steps to remedy overcrowding in one of the state institutions. In -granting the stay pending the Court's
decision in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), Justice Rehnquist commented on the harsh prison conditions: "In short, nobody promised them a rose
garden; and I know of nothing in the Eighth Amendment which requires that they
be housed in a manner most pleasing to them, or considered even by most knowledgeable penal authorities to be likely to avoid confrontations, psychological depression and the like." Atiyeh, 449 U.S. at 1315-16.
139 Bell, 441 U.S. at 545 (citations omitted). This may be an accurate summary of
results in prior cases but as a general principle, it is phrased somewhat more modestly than the principles enunciated in Martinez and Wolff. In those cases, the Court
noted that prisoners retain all those rights not inconsistent with their status as prisoners (which itself hardly proved to be an impregnable barrier to restrictions on the
rights of prisoners). It recallsJustice Rehnquist's linguistic twists in Jones, described
above. See supra note 138, and accompanying text; Martinez, 416 U.S. at 412; Wolff,
418 U.S. at 555-56.
14o Bell, 441 U.S. at 548 (citations omitted).
137

138
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without probable cause, which Justice Rehnquist
wrote
"[a]dmittedly . . . gives us the most pause,"' 4 1 was held to be
42
reasonable. 1

In a lengthy concluding paragraph, Justice Rehnquist professed
approval of the rejection of the traditional "hands off" approach to
prisoners' litigation, but also criticized courts which have "in the
name of the Constitution, become increasingly enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations."' 143 He again stressed the limited role
that courts should play in addressing prisoners' constitutional
claims, noting that "[t]he wide range of 'judgment calls' that meet
constitutional and statutory requirements are confided to officials
outside of the Judicial Branch of Government.""144 Justice Marshall
in dissent again accused the Court of "depart[ing] from the precedent it purports to follow and preclud[ing] effective judicial review
of the conditions of pretrial confinement."' 4 5
Prisoners were not totally shut out in the period after Wolff, but
even the few gains proved limited. In Estelle v. Gamble, 146 for example, the Court held that the "deliberate indifference" of prison officials to the serious medical needs of those confined in the institution
amounted to a violation of the eighth amendment's ban on cruel
and unusual punishment. At the same time, however, the Court rejected arguments that negligent medical care should also form the
basis of a constitutional claim. 14' Additionally, in Hutto v. Finney,

4

the Court held, under a test examining the "totality of conditions,"
that the physical conditions of an institution could be so bad as to
amount to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the eighth
amendment.' 4 ) Hutto was the culmination of the notorious Arkansas prison litigation that revealed shocking conditions that included
not only overcrowding and poor sanitary conditions, but also torture and brutality.' 5 ° Three years later, however, in Rhodes v. Chap'4'

Id. at 558.

142 Id. at
143 Id. at

560.

562.
Id.
145 Id. at 564 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
146 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
147 Id. at 105-06.
144

148

437 U.S. 678 (1978).

149 Id. at 687.
150 Two years later, the brutal nature of American prisons was the central point
of a case involving an issue of criminal, as opposed to constitutional law. In United
States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980), two inmates escaped from a District of
Columbia prison. In a subsequent criminal prosecution for escape, they attempted
to assert the defense of necessity or duress based on the horrible conditions at the
institution. Their efforts to raise the defense of necessity or duress to justify their
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man,1 5 1 in refusing to hold double-bunking per se unconstitutional,
the Court made clear that "to the extent that such conditions are
restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminals
pay for their offenses against society" from which the Constitution
provides no relief.15 2 Perhaps not surprisingly, a number of courts
have viewed Rhodes as an instruction from the Court not to interfere
with the running of institutions..51

Perhaps the culmination of the retreat came in Hudson v.
Palmer.'5 4 In Hudson, an inmate brought an action challenging random "shakedown" cell searches that were conducted, he alleged,
solely to harass him and that had resulted in the destruction of his
personal property. On this issue, Chief Justice Burger, writing for
the Court, held that the complaint did not state a cause of action
escapes were rejected by the trial court. The failure to allow the defendants to
introduce testimony on the conditions at the institution to develop a factual basis
for the defense led the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to reverse. In
turn, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and made
clear that the defense of necessity or duress would be available in a prosecution for
escape in only very limited instances. Id. at 411-12.
The majority opinion drew harsh criticism from Justice Blackmun in dissent:
"The Court, in its carefully structured opinion, does reach a result that might be a
proper one were we living in an ideal world, and were our American jails and penitentiaries truly places for humane and rehabilitative treatment of their inmates....
But we do not live in an ideal world 'even' (to use a self-centered phrase) in
America, so far as jail and prison conditions are concerned." Id. at 420 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun went on to describe the litany of horrors inmates
in American prisons face:
The atrocities and inhuman conditions of prison life in America are
almost unbelievable; surely they are nothing less than shocking. The
dissent in the Bailey case in the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the
"circumstances of prison life are such that at least a colorable, if not
credible, claim of duress or necessity can be raised with respect to virtually every escape. .. "
A youthful inmate can expect to be subjected to homosexual gang
rape his first night in jail, or, it has been said, even in the van on the way
to the jail. Weaker inmates become the property of stronger prisoners

or gangs, who sell the sexual services of the victim. Prison officials
either are disinterested in stopping abuse of prisoners by other prisoners or are incapable of doing so, given the limited resources society allocates to the prison system. Prison officials often are merely indifferent
to serious health and safety needs of prisoners as well.
Even more appalling is the fact that guards frequently participate in
the brutalization of inmates. The classic example is the beating or other
punishment in retaliation for prisoner complaints or court actions.
Id. at 421-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations and footnotes omitted).
151 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
152 Id. at 347.
153 See Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1985); Newman v. Graddick, 740
F.2d 1513 (11 th Cir. 1984).
154 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
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because the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures simply does not apply in prison:
Notwithstanding our caution in approaching claims that
the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable in a given context, we
hold that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any
subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in
his prison cell and that, accordingly, the Fourth Amendment
proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply
within the confines of the prison cell. The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot
be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the needs
and objectives of penal institutions."'
The Court portrayed life in prison as a pitched battle between
correctional officers and violence-prone inmates, whom the Court
characterized as "persons who have a demonstrated proclivity for
antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct[,].

.

. [who have]

shown a lapse in ability to control and conform their behavior to the
legitimate standards of society by the normal impulses of self-restraint.' 5 6 The Court continued that prisoners "have shown an inability to regulate their conduct in a way that reflects either a respect
for law or an appreciation of the rights of others."' 5 7 ChiefJustice
Burger stated that the paramount goal of administrators was to ensure the safety of prison staffs, administrative personnel and visitors.
To that end, he wrote, they need unfettered access to prison cells to
search for drugs, weapons and contraband. 5 ' In balancing the administrators' interest in institutional security against the inmates' interest in the privacy of their cells, Chief Justice Burger gave little
weight to the latter and concluded that "[a] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with
the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order."' 5 9 Thus,
not even the allegation that the sole purpose of the searches was to
harass was sufficient to state a constitutional claim; once the fourth
amendment was held not applicable in prison, any inquiry into the
reasonableness of the searches ended.'" 0
155
156

157
158

159

Id. at 525-26.
Id. at 526.

Id.

Id. at 527.
Id. at 527-28.

160 Id. at 529-30. The Court did suggest, however, without elaboration, that the
eighth amendment stood to protect inmates from "calculated harassment unrelated
to prison needs." Id. at 530. Given the extreme deference prison officials are accorded in addressing security concerns, it is difficult to think of the kind of showing
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The opinion, in Hudson illustrates another significant development in the Court's decisions after Wolff. While the Court based its
analysis on the concept of a "reasonable expectation of privacy" set
forth in Katz v. United States,16 1 the majority otherwise relied very
little, if at all, on non-prison precedents. All its lessons were drawn
from other cases analyzing restrictions on rights in a prison setting.
Prisoners' rights litigation, like prison itself, had become insular, a
world unto itself shut off from the larger society. Whatever hope
inmates might have had of someday entering the constitutional
mainstream on a par with other constituencies, appeared to be
gone.
Justice Stevens, joined by justices Marshall and Brennan, again
dissented. Justice Stevens rejected the Court's holding that "no
matter how malicious, destructive, or arbitrary a cell search and
seizure may be, it cannot constitute an unreasonable invasion of any
privacy or possessory interest that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable."' 6 2 Unlike the majority, Justice Stevens gave much
weight to the interest of inmates subject to the shakedown searches:
"Measured by the conditions that prevail in a free society, neither
the possessions nor the slight residuum of privacy that a prison inmate can retain in his cell, can have more than the most minimal
value."' 6 3 Justice Stevens continued, that "from the standpoint of
the prisoner, however, that trivial residuum may mark the difference
between slavery and humanity." ' 64 Justice Stevens objected to
what he characterized as the Court's view of inmates as "chattels"
an inmate would have to make to state an eighth amendment claim in such a circumstance. Certainly in other contexts, the eighth amendment has been an uncertain, if not unreliable, source of protection. Compare Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263 (1980) (upholding life sentence under habitual offenders act after third offense
of theft totalling slightly more than $200) with Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)
(striking down as cruel and unusual punishment a life sentence without parole
under a habitual offenders statute where prior convictions had been for non-violent
crimes).
161 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
162 Hudson, 468 U.S. at 542 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens suggested
that the Court's resolution of the fourth amendment issue was itself inconsistent
with the eighth amendment:
The Court's implication that prisoners have no possessory interests that
by virtue of the Fourth Amendment are free from state interference cannot, in my view, be squared with the Eighth Amendment. To hold that a
prisoner's possession of a letter from his wife, or a picture of his baby,
has no protection against arbitrary or malicious perusal, seizure, or destruction would not, in my judgment, comport with any civilized standard of decency.
Id. at 546 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
I6(3 Id. at 542 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164

Id.
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and as "fit[ting] into a violent, incorrigible stereotype.' 65 As Justice Stevens saw it, courts have a special responsibility toward
prisoners:
The courts, of course, have a special obligation to protect the
rights of prisoners. Prisoners are truly the outcasts of society.
Disenfranchised, scorned and feared, often deservedly so, shut
away from public view, prisoners are surely a "discrete and insular minority .... The Court's conclusive presumption that
all conduct by prison guards is reasonable is supported by
nothing more than its idiosyncratic view of the imperatives of
prison administration-a view not shared by prison administrators themselves. Such a justification is nothing less than a
decision to sacrifice constitutional principle to the Court's own
assessment of administrative expediency.' 66
Thus, over a span of two decades, the Supreme Court made
clear that prisoners retain at least some rights while incarcerated.
The strength of the Court's commitment to that principle is considerably less certain. The Court's initial efforts to define the precise
contours of the rights of inmates resulted in decisions-culminating
in the 1974 trilogy of Martinez, Pell and Woff-suggesting that inmates shared many of the rights of ordinary citizens and that the
Constitution could serve as a significant constraint on the prerogatives of prison administrators under the appropriate circumstances.
Since the mid-1970s, however, the Court has handed down a series
of decisions in which it has shown a renewed willingness to defer to
the judgment of prison officials and a corresponding reluctance to
interpret the Constitution to limit the actions of those administrators. It is against this background that we must assess the Third
Circuit's approach to complaints by prisoners of unconstitutional
conditions of confinement.
III.
A.

THE THIRD CIRCUIT AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS

Preliminary Observations

Cases brought by prisoners challenging conditions of confinement have been a regular part of the docket of the Third Circuit for at least the past fifteen years. For example, for the year
endingJune 30th, 1988, 384 such cases reached the Third Circuit
from the trial courts, representing approximately fifteen percent
of all cases coming to the court. Moreover, in terms of the
number of cases, the Third Circuit handled as many prisoners'
165

Id. at 553-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

166 Id. at 557 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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rights cases as any other circuit with the exception of the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits. 16 7 These patterns are generally consistent
throughout the period since 1975.168
However, for a number of reasons it is more difficult to assess the body of work of the Third Circuit (or any court of appeals) in a given area than that of the Supreme Court. For
example, unlike the Supreme Court, the judges appointed to the
Third Circuit do not sit as a body in the regular course. Cases
are usually decided by panels of three judges; only rarely will the
court review a decision in banc. Analyses of given cases are,
therefore, more often than not, analyses of the work of a numerical minority of the court. 6 9
Second, and equally as important, the Supreme Court,
through the device of granting and denying certiorari, essentially
chooses its own caseload. Although the Court is still called upon
to hear some mandatory appeals, the vast majority of its docket is
comprised of cases it has selected to hear because it has determined that they raise important issues. 170 It is in part this ability
to select which cases it will hear and which it will not that allows
the Supreme Court to function as an important, rational, policymaking body. Courts of appeals do not enjoy this luxury. Their
cases usually come from the trial courts as appeals of right, 17 1 no
See 1988 ANN. REP. OF ADMIN. OFF. OF CTS. 16.
168 For example, in 1979, the Third Circuit had 91 prisoners' rights cases
167

brought to it on appeal, representing approximately seven percent of its docket;
again, the only circuit with significantly more such cases was the Fourth Circuit.
1979 ANN. REP. OF ADMIN. OFF. OF CTS. A-10. Just as revealing, for the first time in
1979, the number of cases brought by prisoners to federal appellate courts raising
claims of violations of civil rights based on conditions of confinement outnumbered
those cases brought as habeas corpus petitions, 1,069 to 859. Id. The latter calculation, however, must be examined in light of the fact that prisoners seeking to
challenge the fairness of prison disciplinary hearings involving the loss of "good
time" credits must raise that claim through a petition for writ of habeas corpus
rather than a civil rights suit. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). See also
Note, Prison Regulations Constitutionally Valid ifReasonably Related to Legitimate Penological Interests, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 429 (1989) (authored by Robin A. Newman)

(discussing increase in constitutional challenges to prison regulations).
169 Also, to the extent that the identity of those who sit on the bench makes a
difference, a feature of the courts of appeals again makes it difficult to speak of the
work of the court as a discrete body. While the personnel of the Supreme Court
can hardly be said to be static, courts of appeals not only have changes in personnel
typical of any court, but also frequently appoint judges from other courts or jurisdictions to sit "by designation" to hear specific cases and then return to their regular assignments. See 3D CIR. R. 4(1).
170 See L. BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT, 87-101 (1985); D.M. O'BRIEN, STORM
CENTER, 157-212 (1986).
171 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
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matter how frivolous the claims asserted. This is not to say that
important cases do not come to courts of appeals, because obviously they do. But courts of appeals must decide many more
"routine" cases than the Supreme Court. Therefore, not every
reported case represents, or was intended by the court to represent, an opportunity to expand upon or explain a vital issue of
2
law or policy.17
These reasons, as well as the fact that the Supreme Court
officially has the last word on any legal question it chooses, explain why relatively little attention has been given the work of
tourts of appeals, at least in comparison to the attention that the
Supreme Court receives. Nonetheless, courts of appeals do make
vital contributions in areas where the Supreme Court has spoken
loudly and often, as in the area of prisoners' rights. In this area,
the Third Circuit in particular has spoken with a distinctive voice,
according inmates rights beyond those which the Supreme Court
has recognized or shown a willingness to recognize.
B.

Helms v. Hewitt: Deciding What Process is Due

In 1978, Aaron Helms was an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Huntington, Pennsylvania. On December
3rd of that year, a "general disturbance" occurred at the facility
and Helms was removed from the general population to close
administrative custody. 173 Helms was charged with violating disciplinary rules at the institution in connection with the December
3rd disturbance and a hearing was held five days later. At that
hearing, however, the committee made no decision as to Helms's
guilt or innocence regarding the disciplinary charge due to insufficient evidence. The hearing was adjourned to a later date. 74
172 Of course, lower federal courts may indicate which cases they consider important by affirming decisions without written opinions, or by issuing unpublished
opinions.
173 Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d 487, 489-90 (3d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 459 U.S. 460
(1983). "Close administrative" custody was, under Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections regulations, the least restrictive of the four confinement statuses beyond that
imposed upon the general population at the institution. See Helms, 655 F.2d at 490
n.l.
174 Helms, 655 F.2d at 490. The opinion of the court did not explain how the
evidence at the disciplinary hearing was "insufficient." See id. If the evidence was
insufficient to prove Helms's guilt, one would think that he should have been found
"not guilty" and released to general population. Why the institution arrived at its
decision can perhaps only be explained by reference to the "realities of prison life"
that a majority of the Supreme Court likes to cite to justify practices ranging from
double-bunking to visual body-cavity searches. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520 (1979). It is unlikely, to say the least, that the institutional hearing committee
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Helms was kept in restricted custody while the investigation continued. Fifty-one days later, another hearing took place and
Helms was found guilty, based on the testimony of a correctional
officer claiming to summarize the statements of confidential informants. Neither Helms nor the hearing committee were told
the identity of the confidential informants for "safety reasons."
Helms was sentenced to serve an additional six months in re75
stricted confinement. 1
Helms brought suit in federal court, raising two constitutional issues. 17 6 First, he claimed that he was confined in administrative segregation without a hearing, in violation of his rights
under the due process clause. Second, he claimed that the finding of guilt at the disciplinary hearing also violated due process
because it rested solely on the uncorroborated hearsay testimony
of unidentified confidential informants. 1 7 7 The first issue concerned the process required when transferring a prisoner to
more restricted custody within the same institution for administrative as opposed to disciplinary reasons. This question was
similar to the issues raised in Wolff v. McDonnell, 1 78 Meachum v.
Fano 179 and Montanye v. Haymes, 18 ° although it was not specifically
decided by those cases. The second issue similarly refined the
question of the appropriate procedures in prison disciplinary
hearings first considered in Wolff.
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that under Meachum and Montanye,
Helms had no protected liberty interest implicated in his assignment to administrative segregation.' 8 ' As for the reliance on the
hearsay testimony of confidential informants at the disciplinary
hearing, the lower court held that, since inmates have no right to
adjourned Helms's hearing to a later date because the evidence gathered at that
point was insufficient to demonstrate Helms's innocence.
175 Helms, 655 F.2d at 490-91.
176 Id. at 489. Helms brought his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Helms,
655 F.2d at 489. Helms also raised an issue of state law, claiming that the procedures he was given did not comply with those required by the regulations of the
prison. Because of its resolution of the constitutional questions, the Third Circuit
did not address this issue. Id. at 491 n.5.
177 Id. at 491-92.
178 418 U.S. 549 (1974). For a discussion of the Woff decision, see text accompanying supra notes 86-103.
179 427 U.S. 215 (1976). For a discussion of the Meacham decision, see text accompanying supra notes 111-14.
Iso 427 U.S. 236 (1976). For a discussion of Haymes, see supra notes 115-17 and
accompanying text.
181 Helms, 655 F.2d at 492.
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'confrontation and cross-examination at those hearings, the use
of such testimony did not violate due process. 8 2 In an opinion
authored by Judge Rosenn, the Third Circuit unanimously
83
reversed. 1
Judge Rosenn began by considering whether the due process clause was implicated in Helms's assignment to administrative custody. At first it appeared that Judge Rosenn would go
well beyond the Supreme Court's most recent prisoner due process cases by finding a protectible liberty interest in the Constitution itself. Indeed, Judge Rosenn noted two sources for finding
a protectible liberty interest. One source is state law "when the
State, by statute, rule, or regulation, provides that the liberty will
not be infringed except upon the occurrence of specified
events."' 18 4 Judge Rosenn identified the second source as the
Constitution itself when a person suffers a "grievous loss" at the
hands of the State, 8 5 harkening back to the Court's analysis in
some of its early cases.' 8" Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Vitek v. Jones,'8 7 Judge Rosenn observed that
[r]ecently, the Court appears to have moved in this direction,
for it has returned to a more familiar test to ascertain whether
a liberty interest exists: does the action of the state threaten to
impose a "grievous loss" on the individual.... Whatever their
roots, the interests protected under this theory are seen to be
of such fundamental importance that the State need not expressly recognize-indeed, is precluded from denying-their
existence for them to be cloaked with constitutional
protection.'8 8
Judge Rosenn retreated from this approach, however, not because
the loss suffered by the inmate was not serious but because of the
rationale underlying administrative confinement. He noted that
Id.
Id. at 489. Judge Rosenn was joined by judge Garth and Judge Miller of the
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sitting by designation. Id.
184 Id. at 493.
185 Id. at 493-94.
186 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
187 445 U.S. 480 (1980). Vitek involved the involuntary transfer of a convicted
prisoner from a penal institution to a mental institution. The Court found a protectible liberty interest in that transfer not only in the state law governing such a
transfer, but in the Constitution itself due to the "adverse social consequences"
and the "intrusions on personal security" attendant upon involuntary transfer to a
mental institution. Id. at 492 (citations omitted). Additionally, the Court found
that such a transfer was "qualitatively different"from the range of punishments or
conditions of confinement an inmate should expect upon conviction and incarceration. Id. at 493.
188 Helms, 655 F.2d at 494 (citations omitted).
182

183
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courts are less likely to recognize a prisoner's liberty interest in
avoiding administrative confinement, even though the conditions of
administrative confinement are similar to that experienced in disciplinary confinement. 8 ' "This reluctance stems from the observation that administrative confinement is often used to maintain
control in a volatile environment-to quench sparks before they become flames." 9 0
Nonetheless, Judge Rosenn found a protectible liberty interest
in the regulations governing placement in the restricted custody, relying on the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Wright v.
Enomoto.' 9 ' He noted that the Pennsylvania regulations at issue in
the present case stated four grounds for placement in restricted custody: "if necessary to maintain security;" if required by "the need
for control" pending adjudication of a charge for serious misconduct; if "there is a threat of serious disturbance or a serious threat
to the individual or others;" or if the inmate asks for "protective
custody."' 9 "The effect of these regulations," Judge Rosenn ruled,
"is to limit segregation in Administrative and Disciplinary Custody
to particular classes of inmates who meet objective criteria set out in
the rules."'9 3 He concluded that such specifications "establish a liberty interest in all inmates to whom the regulations apply, not to be
segregated in restrictive custody unless the regulatory criteria are
met."' 19 4 Judge Rosenn pointed to the "real" interests that inmates

have in avoiding restrictive confinement and to the need inmates
have for procedural safeguards in order to establish that they do not
fall within the criteria. '95
The court then turned to the question of what procedures are
due when a prisoner is placed in administrative segregation. Helms
did not contest that he had been given some procedural protection;
he had received written notice of the reason for the confinement, an
189 Id.
190 Id.

191 462 F. Supp. 397 (N.D.Cal. 1976), aff'd summ., 434 U.S. 1052 (1978). Like
Helms, Wright involved the issue of the process due in transferring an inmate from
general population to administrative segregation.
right, 462 F. Supp. at 398.

There was a slight difference between the Pennsylvania and California schemes.
Under the Pennsylvania system, the regulations set forth the conditions under

which an inmate could be transferred to administrative segregation, but such transfer was not mandatory even if the conditions were met. Under the California
scheme, once the conditions justifying transfer to restricted custody were met, the
transfer was mandatory.
I,2 Helms, 655 F.2d at 496 n.7.

1'9 Id. at 496.
194

195

Id.
See id. at 496-97.
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opportunity to present his side of the incident, and a review of his
19 6
continued confinement a few weeks after the initial placement.
However, the court held that these procedures were not enough.
Judge Rosenn acknowledged "the importance of swift and decisive
action when using administrative detentions to maintain control and
security at a penal institution."' 9 7 But, in language reminiscent of
the Supreme Court's assurance in Martinez that it would enforce the
rights of inmates even in prison, Judge Rosenn continued,
"[s]ympathetic as we are to these concerns, we are also charged with
interpreting and applying the Constitution."'

98

The court concluded that, because of the similarity between administrative segregation and disciplinary confinement, the procedures set forth in Wolff had to be followed in a transfer to
administrative segregation as well. The court then proceeded to
discuss a remaining issue. It was not contested that Helms's hearing
had to be timely; his main complaint was that he was held for fiftyone days before the hearing that determined the appropriateness of
the confinement. What, then, constituted a timely hearing? Relying
on Third Circuit precedents that predated Wolff, 99 Judge Rosenn
held that a prisoner in Helms's situation, facing transfer to solitary
confinement, "is entitled to a hearing prior to his confinement or,2 0 if
0
exigent circumstances exist, within a reasonable time thereafter.The court determined the hearing which took place fifty-one days
after the transfer did not comport with this standard.2 0 ' The court
remanded the matter to allow the lower court to decide if the initial
hearing five days after the incident was adequate to satisfy due
process.202

The second half ofJudge Rosenn's opinion addressed the issue
of the constitutionality of the use of statements by confidential informants in prison disciplinary hearings. On this issue, the court
ruled in Helms's favor, reversing the determination of guilt made at
his disciplinary hearing. In so doing, the Court noted that the only
evidence presented to the hearing committee was the testimony of a
corrections officer summarizing what he had been told by two confi196 Id. at 497 n.9.
197 Id. at 498.
198 Id.
1'9 Id. at 499 (citing Braxton v. Carlson, 483 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1973); Biagiarelli
v. Sielaff, 483 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1973); Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179 (3d Cir.
1972)).
200 Id. at 500.
201 See id.
202 Id.
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dential informants .2 03 Nothing in the record before the hearing
committee allowed its members to assess the credibility of the informants or to determine that the informants had personal knowledge
of what they told the officer. Characterizing the officer's testimony
as amounting to "next to no evidence," the court held that reliance
on the officer's summaries was unacceptable.2 0 4 "We believe,"
wrote Judge Rosenn, "that in entrusting to prison officials responsibility for promulgating procedures for arriving at an adequate basis
for decision, Wolff intended a genuine, even if single, factfinding
hearing and not a charade.

' 20 5

Moreover, unlike in the Supreme

Court, here the harsh realities of prison life weighed in favor of the
inmate's claim, not against it. The court explained:
Under the tensions and strains of prison living fraught
with intense personal antagonisms, determination of guilt
solely on an investigating officer's secondary report of what an
unidentified informant advised him, albeit by affidavit, invites
disciplinary sanctions on the basis of trumped up charges. A
determination of guilt on such a record, with no primary evidence of guilt in the form of witness statements, oral or written, or any form of corroborative evidence, amounts to a
determination on the blind acceptance of the prison officer's
statement. Such a practice is unacceptable; it does not fulfill
Wolff's perception of "mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objections" and constitutional requirements
of due process.2 0 6
Judge Rosenn conceded that Helms had no right to cross-examine the informants but reasoned that protection against such uncorroborated hearsay was required by the right to a written
statement of reasons and of the evidence relied upon. 0 7 Drawing
the appropriate procedures from a case decided by the First Circuit, 20 8 the court held that before the testimony of confidential in-

formants could be used, two conditions must be met:
(1) [T]he record must contain some underlying factual information from which the [tribunal] can reasonably conclude that
the informant was credible or his information reliable; (2) the
record must contain the informant's statement [written or reported] in language that is factual rather than conclusionary
and must establish by its specificity that the informant spoke
203
204
205

Id. at 501.
Id. at 502.
Id.

206

Id. (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)).

207

Id.

208

Id. (citing Gomes v. Travisono, 510 F.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1974)).
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with the personal
knowledge of the matters contained in such
20 9
statement.
Helms represented a modest advance in terms of the rights of
prisoners. The precise issue of what, if any, process is due in connection with a transfer to administrative segregation had not been
decided before, but cases raising similar issues certainly had been
considered. Judge Rosenn's opinion is not a bold entry into newlychartered areas, but one which follows the correct course dictated
by precedents of the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, including prior decisions of the Third Circuit. By 1981, the Supreme
Court's renewed hostility to prisoners' claims might have led a cautious court to follow Meachum and Montanye and to declare that no
liberty interest was implicated in the transfer to administrative segregation, or at least to defer to prison administrators in determining
the procedures that officials would have to follow. On the other
hand, the court's ruling that confinement to segregation, whether
for punitive or disciplinary reasons, is essentially the same and
should require identical procedures-with a slight adjustment to allow for the exigencies in which decisions to transfer to administrative segregation are sometimes made-is reasonable. In short,
nothing in the case indicated that it warranted the Court's granting
certiorari, except perhaps for the fact that the inmates, rather than
the administrators, had prevailed.21 0 Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari "to consider what limits the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places on the authority of
prison administrators to remove inmates from the general prison
population and confine them to a less desirable regimen for administrative reasons." '' The Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the Third Circuit.
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist, initially filled in
many details of the events that occurred on the evening of December 3rd, 1978, and in so doing set the tone for the opinion that
followed. What Judge Rosenn had labelled simply a "general disturbance," Justice Rehnquist perceived as a "riot" in which groups
of inmates had attempted to seize control of the institution and a
Id. (quoting Gomes v. Travisono, 510 F.2d 537, 541 (lst Cir. 1974)).
See Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491 (1985). In Ponte, Justices Stevens and Marshall, in separate concurring and dissenting opinions, objected to what they perceived as a pattern by the Court of agreeing to hear inconsequential cases pressed
by State Attorneys General who have no better reason for seeking high Court review than dissatisfaction with a lower court ruling in favor of inmates. Id. at 501-02
(Stevens, J., concurring); id.at 522-23 n.21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
211 Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 462 (1983).
209

2 10
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number of correctional officers had sustained injuries. 2 12
The Court agreed with the Third Circuit that the Pennsylvania
regulations gave inmates a protectible liberty interest in avoiding
administrative segregation. Like Judge Rosenn, Justice Rehnquist
also arrived at that conclusion by taking a long road, although it was
a significantly different detour. Judge Rosenn had at first considered whether the inmates' interest in avoiding administrative segregation was so important that the liberty interest protecting it was
rooted in the Constitution rather than merely in state law. 2 , 3 Justice

Rehnquist approached from the opposite direction and questioned
whether the Pennsylvania regulations, or any prison regulations,
could confer a liberty interest protectible under the fourteenth
amendment.
After beginning with the now almost ritualistic bow given to the
deference of prison administrators,21 4 Justice Rehnquist continued
that "the transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more restrictive
quarters for nonpunitive reasons is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence. ' 21 5 This was
especially true for prisoners in Pennsylvania, Justice Rehnquist
maintained, since prison officials there used administrative segregation as something of a "catchall," making it the "sort of confinement
that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in
their incarceration. "216 Of course, before the Third Circuit opinion
in Helms, inmates had no right to the procedures necessary to make
certain that officials were using administrative segregation properly.
In any event, the proposition that the more inmates were subjected
to restrictive or harsh conditions (and hence, the more they should
expect them), the less they were entitled to procedures to guard
against the inappropriate or arbitrary imposition of those conditions, has a certain Alice-in-Wonderland quality to it. It does, however, lead into Justice Rehnquist's next point.
Justice Rehnquist's central objection to recognizing a liberty interest for Helms was not confined to circumstances unique to Pennsylvania, he appeared to object to any effort to curtail the discretion
of administrators. Despite the apparent similarity between assignment to disciplinary confinement and transfer to administrative confinement noted by Judge Rosenn, Justice Rehnquist stated that the

213

Id. at 462-63.
See supra notes 184-90 and accompanying text.

214

Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 467.

215

Id. at 468.

212

2 16 Id.
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Court had "never held that statutes and regulations governing the
daily operation of a prison system conferred any liberty interest in
and of themselves."'2 17 Justice Rehnquist distinguished Wolff as involving the loss of good time credits which, like parole, actually affected the time spent in custody. 2 8 Because of the difficulties in
running a prison on a daily basis, Justice Rehnquist argued, "we
should be loath" to apply the reasoning of prior cases and hold that
regulations that guide discretion can create liberty interests that, in
turn, interfere with that discretion. 2 t 9 Justice Rehnquist went so far
as to suggest that regulations "structuring the authority of prison
administrators may warrant treatment, for purposes of creation of
entitlements to 'liberty,' different from statutes and regulations in
other areas. ' 2 20 He posited that finding a liberty interest in regulations voluntarily promulgated by states punished those states that
took that laudable step:
The creation of procedural guidelines to channel the decisionmaking of prison officials is, in the view of many experts in the
field, a salutary development. It would be ironic to hold that
217 Id. at 469. Of course, much of the force ofJustice Rehnquist's point about the
Court's prior holdings is limited by the fact that both the concept of statutorilycreated liberty interests and the Court's willingness to review inmate complaints
regarding unconstitutional conditions were of relatively recent vintage at the times
Hewitt was decided.
218 Id. at 470. Ironically, in Wolff, the Court distinguished prison disciplinary
hearings from parole revocation hearings and thereby justified the fewer procedural protections mandated in WVolff than required in lorrissey. It did this, in part,
on its assessment that loss of parole resulted in certain loss of liberty. Loss of
"good time" credits the 'o/ff majority noted, did not necessarily translate into a
delay of parole eligibility or more time spent in prison. See Wolff v. McDonald, 418
U.S. 549, 560-62 (1974).
Even on his own terms, by shifting the focus of interests, Justice Rehnquist
compares unequals. It is true that from the inmate's point of view, the consequences of a loss of good time are different, and probably worse, than a stay in
administrative segregation. However, from the administrator's point of view, there
is little difference between the intrusiveness of a federal court dictating the procedures to be followed in disciplinary proceedings, and dictating those that are to be
followed in transferring inmates to administrative segregation. Both types of decisions are made in the institution with sufficient regularity to fall within any reasonable definition of "daily operations." Moreover, Justice Rehnquist's focus on the
impact on the inmate sounds very much like the "grievous loss" analysis that the
Court had employed in some early decisions but that had been abandoned in W0/ff
and the cases that followed. See text accompanying supra notes 109-66. To the
extent that the "grievous loss" test applies, one would have to say that Judge
Rosenn was truer to the precedents in suggesting that confinement in administrative segregation constitutes such a "grievous loss." Certainly any definition of
"grievous loss" that turns on an actual loss of liberty would create a very high
threshold.
219 Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 470.
220 Id.
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when a State embarks on such desirable experimentation it
thereby opens the door to scrutiny by the federal courts, while
provisions enStates that choose not to adopt such procedural
22 1
tirely avoid the Due Process Clause.
This "irony," if it is one, 2 22 deserves further comment. For one
thing, the irony is deeper than Justice Rehnquist recognizes. In
cases such as BellJones, and Hudson, the Court's willingness to defer
to prison administrators in matters of security and control resulted
in the elimination or near elimination of substantive constitutional
rights in the prison setting. Moreover, it led the Court to grant constitutional imprimatur to practices such as visual body-cavity
searches without probable cause and deliberately destructive shakedown searches. What is truly ironic, then, is that broadly-worded
phrases in the regulations that speak to such security concerns serve
in Helms to introduce federal court scrutiny into the process and
provide at least procedural, if not substantive protection that inmates might not have otherwise.
Second, the irony, which exists in non-prison contexts as
well, 223 is to a large extent designed by the Court. It was the

Supreme Court, after all, that refused to find a liberty interest in the
Constitution, and claimed to find it only in positive state law, which
the state can dispense with on a whim. Securing the right to due
process by grounding it in the Constitution, as the Court had once
suggested, 22 4 rather than in the much more fragile vessel of state
Id. at 471.
What is ironic is to applaud states that "voluntarily" promulgate regulations
to control the exercise of discretion in prisons while also asserting that any procedures insisted upon to ensure that they are correctly followed punishes those who
promulgated the regulations.
223 For example, state and local governments that voluntarily promulgate regulations that allow dismissal from public employment only for cause similarly provide
procedural protection for their employees and subject themselves to federal court
scrutiny that would otherwise not exist. Compare Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972) with Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). But see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). In Loudermill, the Court held that a state statute
could create a property interest protectible under the due process clause, but the
state could not define or limit by statute the procedures to which one would be
constitutionally entitled. Id. at 541. The Court thus made clear its rejection of the
plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), and suggested that the
approach under the due process clause was not strictly positivist. Id. at 541 (citing
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974)).
224 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972);Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). To be
fair, it must be pointed out that the retreat into positivism and consequent narrowing of protected interests under the due process clause marked by Meachum and
Montanye also occurred outside the prison context. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
221

222
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law, may not be what Justice Rehnquist wanted, but such a result
would not be ironic.
Finally, even conceding the irony, it does not automatically follow that the appropriate remedy is, as Justice Rehnquist argues, to
remove the procedural protection. One might conclude that the opposite course is the one to take: to impose procedural protection
based on the due process clause regardless of state law. This remedy is at least faithful to one of the underlying purposes of the
clause: to control arbitrary governmental action. 2 2 5 It is not gener-

ally part of our jurisprudence to encourage unfettered discretion in
the hands of governmental officials. To believe that this is inherently preferable in the prison context assumes at least one of the
conclusions.
The real point is not that Justice Rehnquist, in dictum, made an
argument that may not withstand careful analysis. His argument
reveals, and is a product of, a more important attitude that pervades
the post- Wolff cases: the refusal of many members of the Court, usually a majority, to credit the concerns of the inmates in the balance
of interests. As a corollary, the Court gave practically unquestioning weight to the interests of prison administrators as expressed by
those officials.
This was made explicit in the second half ofJustice Rehnquist's
opinion. As noted, despite Justice Rehnquist's doubts, the Court
did find a state-created liberty interest warranting due process protection in the "unmistakably mandatory character" of the language
of the regulations, "requiring that certain procedures 'shall,' 'will,'
or 'must' be employed .... and that administrative segregation will

not occur absent specified substantive predicates." 2 " In this regard, the Court agreed with the Third Circuit, although the differences in approach between the two opinions are significant.
Having decided that due process protection was required in the
decision to transfer someone to administrative segregation, the next
issue was, what process was due? The Third Circuit had held that
since confinement in segregation is, from the inmate's perspective,
the same whether it is labelled "administrative" or "disciplinary,"
the procedures set forth in Wolff governed in both instances. The
Third Circuit accommodated an important penal interest by adapt693 (1976). See generally L.

1987).

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 10-8 (2d ed.

225 It would also serve the purpose of making the rights of inmates in different
states uniform, another goal of the Constitution, which would again eliminate the
irony to which Justice Rehnquist objects.
226 Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72 (citations omitted).
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ing the procedures to the special purpose of administrative segregation, by adjusting the timing of the hearing, and by allowing officials
to wait until a "reasonable time" after placement to hold the hearing if required by the exigencies of the situation. 2 7
On this point the Supreme Court reversed, and held that even if
Helms were entitled to some procedural protection in the decision
to transfer him from general population to administrative segregation, he had been accorded all the process that was due by receiving
notice of the reason for the placement and an opportunity to present his version. Using the three-step analysis set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge,128 the Court began by finding the governmental interest in
placing inmates in administrative confinement, based on the desire
to maintain peace and safety in the institution, to be of great importance. In contrast to the finding of Judge Rosenn, however, the
Court minimized the importance of the inmate's interest:
"[r]espondent's private interest is not one of great consequence.
He was merely transferred from one extremely restricted environ229
ment to an even more confined situation.
Finally, the Court noted that additional procedures would not
really help the decision-maker determine the appropriateness of the
placement. The Court reasoned that this is so because the appropriate reason for placing an inmate in administrative segregation
will often be subjective rather than objective:
In the volatile atmosphere of a prison, an inmate easily may
constitute an unacceptable threat to the safety of other prisoners and guards even if he himself has committed no misconduct; rumor, reputation, and even more imponderable factors
may suffice to spark potentially disastrous incidents. The
judgment of prison officials in this context, like that of those
making parole decisions, turns largely on "purely 2subjective
30
evaluations and on predictions of future behavior."

So ethereal and amorphous are the criteria the Court recognizes
See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
424 U.S. 319 (1976). Mathews teaches that, in determining what procedures
are due in a given situation, a court should consider three elements: the private
interests at stake, the governmental interests at stake, and whether increased procedural protection will aid in making the appropriate decision. Id. at 335.
221) Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 473. Further evidence of how out of touch with the realities of prison life the Court was, at least from the inmates' perspective, is their
reasoning that the inmate's interest is slight since confinement to administrative
confinement does not carry the same "stigma" as does a sentence to serve time in
"disciplinary" confinement. See id.
230 Id. at 474 (quoting Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458,
464 (1981)).
227
228
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that one must concede the point: given the factors identified upon
which administrators may base a decision to transfer an inmate to
administrative segregation, it is difficult to conceive of what the inmate could offer by way of evidence to defend against the decision.
However, that it is appropriate to allow officials to make the decision
on nearly unreviewable criteria and thereby vest such power in
prison officials in the first place, a more fundamental inquiry, 2 3 1 is
simply accepted without question.
For these reasons, the Court concluded that prison officials
"were obligated to engage only in an informal, nonadversary review
of the information supporting respondent's administrative confinement, including whatever statement respondent wished to submit,
within a reasonable time after confining him to administrative
segregation."

23 2

A subsequent decision of the Third Circuit deserves brief mention. Mims v. Shapp 23 3 is testament not only to the tendency of constitutional litigation to expand to the next logical conclusion, but
also of the limits of the freedom of lower courts-or at least the
Third Circuit-in the face of controlling Supreme Court precedent.
Mims involved a prisoner, who had been sentenced to jail for murdering a police officer, and who also participated in the murder of
the deputy warden while in prison. He was placed in administrative
confinement without a prior hearing but did receive monthly reviews during his five-year confinement.2 34 The issue before the
court was what procedure was due, not at the initial transfer into
231 Again admittedly in other contexts, the Court has been much more skeptical
of the use of broadly-worded or purely subjective criteria to guide official decisionmaking where the result might be to curtail constitutional rights. See, e.g., City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138 (1988); Shuttlesworth v.
City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
232 Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472. Justices Stevens, Brennan and Marshall dissented
from the Court's opinion. Id. at 479 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
agreed that a liberty interest was implicated by an inmate's transfer to administrative segregation, but he would have found the source of that liberty interest not in
state law, or even the Constitution, but in natural law, as described in the preamble
of the Declaration of Independence. See id. at 483 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens posited that prisoners needed more procedural protection than the informal process approved by the majority. Among the concerns expressed by Justice
Stevens on this issue were that poorly educated inmates would not be able to participate in a meaningful way if administrators chose to allow inmates to submit only
written statements. Id. at 490 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Additionally, he noted that
administrators might use an extended stay in administrative segregation as a pretext to punish inmates for incidents for which there was insufficient evidence to
prove a disciplinary charge. Id. at 491-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
233 744 F.2d 947 (3d Cir. 1984).
234 Id. at 948-49.
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administrative segregation as in Helms, but at the periodic review
mandated by Helms.2 35
The case actually came to the Third Circuit twice. The first
time, after the Third Circuit's decision in Helms but before the
Supreme Court's reversal, Judge Aldisert wrote an opinion affirming a district court holding that the prisoners' right to due process was violated by the lengthy stay and the use of subjective
evaluations in the periodic reviews.23 6 One effect of the initial opinion was to require that continued confinement in administrative segregation be based on objective criteria.
The case was remanded by the Third Circuit after the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Helms.2 7 On remand, the court reversed
in another opinion written by Judge Aldisert. Judge Aldisert was
compelled by the Supreme Court decision in Helms to hold that use
of subjective criteria during the periodic reviews was permissible.2 3 8
Moreover, the court recognized that the prisoner's substantial history of violence increased the importance of concerns for security. 23

9

Nonetheless, the court described the very harsh conditions in

administrative segregation and pointed to the fact that the inmate's
stay would probably have been limitless if not for his lawsuit. The
court noted that "[e]ven with the heightened governmental interest
existent in this case, Burton's correspondingly heightened private
interest makes resolution of the due process issue difficult,"

24 °

and

expressed concern that "periodic review does not simply become a
sham."

C.

24

'I

Shabazz v. O'Lone: Freedom of Religion and the Least
Restrictive Alternative Test

Three years after the Supreme Court's decision in Hewitt, the
Third Circuit handed down its decision in Shabazz v. O'Lone.2 4 2 In
Shabazz, the court directly confronted the clash between institutional rules and prisoners' right to free exercise of religion, an
issue that had not been squarely addressed by the Supreme
Court.
At the heart of the dispute in Shabazz was the Jumu'ah, a
Id. at 948.
See id. The Third Circuit's first opinion in this matter is unpublished. Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 951; see supra note 229 and accompanying text.
239 Id. at 951 n.4.
240 Id. at 951.
241 Id.
at 954.
242 782 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S.Ct. 2400 (1987).
235
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weekly congregate religious service that is central to the Muslim
religion. Pursuant to Muslim religious doctrine, the Jumu'ah
must be recited at noon every Friday. Accordingly, prison officials at the New Jersey State Prison at Leesburg, a medium security institution, allowed aJumu'ah prayer service to be held in the
main building of the institution every Friday around noon.2 4 3
The plaintiffs in Shabazz, Ahmad Uthman Shabazz and SadrUd-Din Mateen, were two Muslims incarcerated at Leesburg. Because of their security classifications, both worked outside the
prison, as did other Muslims. Prior to 1984, prison officials accommodated the Muslims; inmates who wanted to participate in
the congregate prayer service but whose jobs normally took them
away from the main building were either allowed to travel back to
the institution on their own specifically to participate in the
Jumu'ah or were assigned to other jobs in the building on
2 44
Friday.
This situation had changed by early 1984 after officials
passed two regulations unrelated to the Jumu'ah. The first regulation, actually passed in April of 1983, required all inmates classified as "gang minimum" to work outside the institution. The
regulation was passed to relieve overcrowding by reducing the
number of inmates actually present in the main building during
the day, but a side effect was to eliminate the alternative Friday
work details to which some Muslims had been assigned to participate in the prayer service. The second measure, designed to reduce discipline and security problems, prohibited inmates from
returning on their own to the main building from outside work
details. 4 5 The practical result of the two regulations was to prevent a large number of Muslims from participating in the
Jumu'ah. Even though there had been no incidents under the
old system, prison officials refused to relax the new regulations
for Muslims seeking to exercise their first amendment rights.
Shabazz and Mateen brought suit to challenge the regulations,
alleging that enforcement of the regulations violated their right
to free exercise of religion. 4 6
It is somewhat surprising, given the prominent role religion
plays in prison and the fact that many of the early lower federal
court prisoners' rights cases involved allegations of discrimina243

244
245
24i

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at
at
at

417.
417-18.
418.
419.
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tion along religious lines,2 4 7 that the Supreme Court had not decided a case establishing the proper standard for analyzing first
amendment religion claims of prisoners.2 4 8 Just six years before
Shabazz, the Third Circuit had set forth an approach to such
claims in Saint Claire v. Cuyler.2 4 9 In that case, the court rejected
the claims of a Muslim inmate in a Pennsylvania prison that enforcement of institutional rules governing clothing violated his
first amendment right to free exercise of religion.2 50 Relying on
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.,25 the court
adopted a self-consciously deferential standard: tojustify restrictions on inmates' religious freedom, prison officials need only
produce evidence that a potential danger to institutional security
might result from allowing prisoners to exercize their first
amendment rights.2 5 2 Once that is done, courts must defer to
the judgment of prison officials unless the inmate establishes by
"substantial evidence" that the officials have "exaggerated their
response" to the security concerns.2 5 3 The court made clear that
its decision was based on the "wide-ranging deference that must
be accorded prison officials and the determination that first
amendment values must give way to the reasonable considerations of prison management" mandated by recent Supreme
Court decisions.2 5 4
Applying the test set forth in Saint Claire, the trial court in
25 5
Shabazz rejected the prisoners' challenge to the regulations.
While the Third Circuit also initially rejected the inmates' claim,
247 See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.1971); Sewell v. Pegelow,
291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961).
248 In two earlier cases, the Court declared as a general proposition that inmates
retain at least some right to religious freedom while in prison, but did not give any
content to that right or make clear how prisoners' first amendment religion claims
were to be analyzed. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Cooper v. Pate, 378
U.S. 546 (1964).
249 634 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1980).
250 Id. at 110-11. The challenged regulations precluded inmates from wearing
religious head coverings in the prison dining room, and when passing through the
prison security gate. Id. at 110. Additionally, an inmate alleged that the institution's denial of his request to attend Muslim religious services while in segregated
confinement violated his free exercise rights. Id. at 111-12.
251 433 U.S. 119 (1977). See supra notes 120-32 and accompanying text.
252 Saint Claire, 634 F.2d at 114 (footnote omitted). The court further explained
that the "evidence may consist of expert testimony from the responsible officials,
provided they testify to opinions that are 'held sincerely and [are] arguably correct.' " Id. (quotingJones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S.
119, 127 (1977)).
253 Id. at 114-15.
254 Id. at 114.
255 Shabazz v. O'Lone, 595 F. Supp. 928, 935 (D.N.J. 1984).
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the court subsequently reconsidered the case. Claiming that
"there has been an increasing concern that the Saint Claire test
provides inadequate protection for the rights of prisoners freely
to exercise their religion, ' 25 6 the Third Circuit granted rehearing
in banc, sua sponte, 2 5 7 "for the purpose of reconsidering the
Saint Claire standard. ' 258 The Court then proceeded, by a margin
of nine to two, to vacate the prior holding and remand the matter
for further consideration.2 5 9
Judge Adams began by noting the tension inherent in a
prison setting. "Imprisonment necessarily places limits upon
many of the constitutional freedoms enjoyed by free citizens,"
yet inmates do retain those rights "not inconsistent with their
status as prisoners or with the legitimate penological goals of the
corrections system." ' 260 It is the duty of the federal courts, he
continued, to protect those rights.2 6 ' Citing Wolff, Judge Adams
spoke of the need for a "mutual accommodation" of the interests
of both sides. 26 2 The flaw in Saint Claire, according to the majority, was that it did not achieve that accommodation:
[T]he standard articulated in St. Claire does not call for such an
accommodation. Rather, under St. Claire, a mere declaration
by prison officials that certain religious practices raise potential security concerns is sufficient to override a prisoner's first
amendment right to attend the central religious service of his
faith. The prison officials are not required to produce convincing evidence that they are unable to satisfy their institutional goals in any way that does not infringe the inmates' free
exercise rights. Nor do they carry a burden of showing that
bona fide security problems occurred or are likely to arise because of the religious practice at issue.

63

Judge Adams noted that prison officials had not only promulgated
the regulations for security reasons, but had objected, also for reasons of security, to alternatives suggested by the prisoners that at256

Shabazz, 782 F.2d at 417.

257 While the Third Circuit's opinion does not make it clear, the majority opinion
in the Supreme Court states that the grant of rehearing in banc was at the appellate
court's own direction. See O'Lone v. Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2403 (1987).
258

Shabazz, 782 F.2d at 417.

Id. at 421. Judge Adams was joined by Judges Seitz, Gibbons, Weis, Higginbotham, Sloviter, Becker, Stapleton and Mansmann. Judges Hunter and Garth dissented from the majority opinion.
261) Id. at 419 (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433
U.S. 119 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)).
261 Id. (citations omitted).
"26 Id. (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)).
259

263

Id.
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tempted to address the security concerns while allowing them to
participate in the congregate service. Yet under the Saint Claire standard, the officials had no obligation "to establish that such security
concerns were genuine and were based upon more than
speculation.

2 64

The court therefore held that the Saint Claire standard inadequately protected inmates' rights by failing to require an inquiry
into the feasibility of ways to accommodate their interest. 2 65 Upon
remand, prison officials would have to show "that the challenged
regulations were intended to serve, and do serve, the important penological goal of security, and that no reasonable method exists by
which appellants' religious rights can be accommodated without
creating bona fide security problems. 2 6 6 Judge Adams further
stated that, in making the appropriate inquiry, the expert testimony
of prison officials could be given "due weight" but was not to be
treated as "dispositive" of whether a reasonable adjustment was
possible.2 6 v Once again, as in Helms, the court identified the inmates' interest as "particularly strong,

'2 68

but found the interests of

the prison officials to be great as well. For that reason, the court did
not decide the ultimate issue of the constitutionality of the regulations, but remanded it to the lower court to make the necessary factual inquiry.2 6 9
Judge Adams denied that the majority's approach was inconsistent with the deference called for by the recent Supreme Court
cases. He conceded that prison officials are entitled to deference,
"but where first amendment values are implicated such deference
must be tempered by an effort to accommodate free exercise values."'2 7 1 "[W]hile we are not unaware of the role that the deference
principle has played in the Supreme Court's opinions regarding
prisoners' rights," concluded Judge Adams, "and indeed subscribe
to that principle, we seek only to ensure that it does not deprive
271
prisoners' free exercise rights of all content."

Judge Hunter, joined by Judge Garth, dissented, claiming that
the majority was departing from the appropriate precedents articu-

266

Id. at 419-20.
Id. at 420.
Id. (citations omitted).

267

Id.

268

Id. at 421.

264
265

269

Id.

270

Id. at 420.

271

Id.
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lated by the Supreme Court.2 72 Judge Hunter questioned the "unsupported" assertion that there was general dissatisfaction with the
Saint Claire standard.2 73 However, he reserved his strongest criticism for the retreat by the majority from the deference he believed
due to the judgment of prison administrators:
Although the majority opinion recognizes and reiterates
the deference principle, the standard announced today displays a lack of appreciation for the considerations supporting
this principle. In part, deference is dictated by the very fact
that our prisons are "places of involuntary confinement of persons who have demonstrated a proclivity for antisocial criminal and often violent conduct. Deference also stems from the
inherent nature of the judicial branch as separate from those
branches that administer our prisons,
and lacking in the exper2 74
tise to run correctional facilities.
Judge Hunter accused the court of having usurped a greater
role than was warranted. He explained that "under the majority's
mutual accommodation standard, federal courts are no longer
guardians of fundamental constitutional rights but arbitrators in disputes between prison officials and inmates. 275 He continued that
"[t]o facilitate this dubious new calling, the majority asks federal
judges to second guess the administrators' judgment by finding 'a
reasonable method' to accommodate inmates. 2 7 6 Judge Hunter
warned that "[tihis new standard opens the door to a floodgate of
future litigation to determine what 'reasonable' accommodation
must be permitted to override security or other penological objectives," '2 77 and that the standard "will not only cause substantial
problems in the already difficult field of prison administration, but it
will necessarily result in an impairment of security in those institu2 78
tions where security is the primary consideration.
The majority opinion in Shabazz, more than Helms, represented
a departure from Supreme Court precedent, despite the court's insistence that it accepted and was following prior teachings. To be
Id. at 425 (Hunter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 422 (Hunter, J., dissenting) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517
(1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)).
275 Id. at 423 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
276 Id.
277 Id. at 425 (Hunter, J., dissenting). In the second half of his dissent, Judge
Hunter argued that, even under the standard devised by the majority, the prison
officials had produced enough testimony of the security dangers posed by the regulations and the alternatives suggested by the inmates to uphold the regulations. Id.
at 426-30 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
278 Id. at 431 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
272
273
274
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sure, Shabazz was not the first decision to require officials to consider
whether less restrictive alternatives existed by which one could accommodate both institutional and inmate interests.2 79 Indeed, it
was not even the first Third Circuit case to require such an inquiry.
In O'Malley v. Brierley,2 8 ° the court reversed a grant of summary
judgment against inmates who challenged the decision of prison officials not to allow their clergymen to visit them.2 8 ' In remanding
the case for trial, Judge Aldisert explained, "[i]n arriving at its 'reasonableness' determination, the fact finder shall find the regulation
to be reasonable only if the alternative chosen (complete exclusion
[of the priests]) result[s] in the least possible 'regulation' of the constitutional right consistent with the maintenance of prison
discipline.

28 2

Nonetheless, the court's in banc decision in Shabazz differs in
important ways from the Supreme Court decisions it claims to follow. As in Helms, the court accorded great weight to the interest of
the inmates. Judge Adams's opinion went further, however. While
conceding the importance of the institution's interests, Judge Adams refused to accept unquestioningly that administrators or other
prison officials always give proper regard to the inmates' interests or
even that they always act in good faith. The result was a standard
that, while not totally eschewing deference, was certainly more balanced than that employed by the Supreme Court in cases such as
Jones, Bell and Hudson.
This willingness to question the motives of prison officials may
partly explain, or at least justify, an approach that insists on an inquiry into less restrictive alternatives. Imposing the requirement
279 See, e.g., Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307 (8th Cir. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987); Gallahan v. Hollyfield, 670 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1982);
Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975). Even the Supreme Court, in Martinez, had held that restrictions on first amendment freedoms could not be justified
unless they were "no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the
particular governmental interest involved." Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413. That, of
course, was an explication of the rights of those outside the institution seeking to
communicate with inmates. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
280 477 F.2d 785 (3d Cir. 1973).
281 Id. at 786. Ironically,Judge Aldisert, writing for a unanimous panel, held that
the priests had no right to visit the institution, and that summary judgment against
them was appropriate. Id. at 795. Recognizing that the inmates may have constitutionally protected rights to free exercise of religion, the Court reversed the grant of
summary judgment against them. Id. at 796.
282 Id. at 796. The trial court in Saint Claire had relied on O'Malley to require an
inquiry into less restrictive alternatives. Saint Claire v. Cuyler, 481 F. Supp. 732,
737 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd, 634 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1980). The Third Circuit in Saint
Claire rejected this approach and adopted the deferential approach that was subsequently discarded in Shabazz. See Saint Claire, 634 F.2d at 114.
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that officials demonstrate that they have considered alternatives and
that no other course of action would further the institutional goals
without raising other security concerns may be, as the court claimed,
a necessary part of the "mutual accommodation" required by Wolff.
Additionally, it is a way to ensure that administrators' proffered security justifications are real and are asserted in good faith. In this
regard, a "least restrictive alternative" test, or something close to it,
calls to mind John Hart Ely's analysis of the interplay between the
"strict scrutiny" test employed for analysis of equal protection
claims and the search for unconstitutional motivation.2"' If in fact
there are easy alternatives by which administrators could allow inmates to exercise their right to worship without jeopardizing institutional security and those alternatives are not adopted, it is at least
some evidence that the administrators are concerned with more
28
than just insuring institutional security.

4

283 SeeJ. ELY, supra note 27, at 145-70. Ely argues that the two prong test-that
is, the law must further a compelling state interest and must be necessary to achieve
that goal-used to analyze laws that impact on a "suspect classification" such as
race may be understood as a way to discover unconstitutional motivation. Id. at
145-46. Ely argues that when confronted with a law that by its terms, disadvantages
a member of a suspect classification, one would naturally suspect that the purpose
of the legislation was simply to harm members of that group. Ely sets forth the
criteria to allay this suspicion:
[to start with, the classification fits as well as it fits the goal of comparatively disadvantaging the minority affected. For if it turns out that the
classification fits the invidious goal more closely than it fits the goal the
state now comes up with, you will ask why they didn't classify in terms
more germane to the goal they are now arguing, and your suspicion that
the goal suggested by the face of the statute was the real one will hardly
be allayed.
Id. at 147. Even if there is a tight fit between the means selected and the proffered
goal, however, that is only half the equation and you must still look for a governmental interest of sufficient weight: "For even a perfect fit between the classification in issue and the goal the state is arguing shouldn't be enough to allay your
initial suspicion if that goal is so unimportant that you have to suspect it's a pretext
that didn't actually generate the choice." Id. at 147-48. Of course, in the context of
prisoners' rights, with the frequent resort to security to justify any and all regulations, there is no question about the importance of the asserted governmental interest. Nonetheless, the first half of Ely's analysis seems relevant in the prisoners'
rights context.
284 It is important to keep in mind the limitations of the relevance of unconstitutional motivation for the issue in Shabazz. Ely was considering the problem raised
by cases in which the underlying governmental action was not in and of itself unconstitutional but only became so because it was undertaken to discriminate, or to
impermissibly disadvantage a minority group. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U.S. 271 (1971) (suit challenging town officials' closing of municipal pools after
directed to open pools to blacks). Actions challenged as an unconstitutional infringement on the right of free exercise of religion will usually be struck down if the
effect of the action is to inhibit the free exercise of religion, even if one can be
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This skepticism is different from the approach of the Supreme
Court, at least in post-Wolff cases, in which the Court assumes that
administrators are in fact motivated by the security concerns they
claim and that they invariably act reasonably in assessing the situation. 8 5 While it is true that the Court's decision in Jones did purport
to require that the views of prison officials be "held sincerely" as
well as "arguably correct,-

2 86

it

is clear that in the context of the

opinion, that language expressed not skepticism toward the officials
but a take-off point for even greater deference. The Court neither
developed any way to determine whether officials' opinions were
sincerely held and correct, nor engaged in any inquiry to see if this
was so. Nor in subsequent cases did the Court suggest that there
was any real substance to the inquiry described in Jones. Indeed, in
Hudson, the Court rejected the inmate's claim even after assuming as
true the allegation that the shakedown searches at issue were done
to harass him. In this way, the Third Circuit's decision in Shabazz
departed from the Supreme Court's decisions of the past decade, by
introducing into the analysis a meaningful assessment of the reasonableness and good faith of prison administrators whose actions are
claimed to be motivated by security concerns.
Given these important differences in approach it is not surprising that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Shabazz and reversed.287 The approach of the Third Circuit was largely, although
not totally, discarded. The Court upheld the regulations and criticized the Third Circuit decision as not sufficiently deferential.2 8 8
Employing the analysis first set forth nine days earlier in its decision
in Turner v. Safley,Z8 9 justice Rehnquist, again writing for the Shabazz
certain that it was not the purpose of the action. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705 (1977); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
285 It was this attitude that Justice Stevens criticized in his dissenting opinion in
Hudson. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 542, (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
A number of commentators have been much less willing to accept the good faith
and reasonableness ofjudgments made by prison officials and guards. See Berger,
supra note 18, at 22. "Probably the most abhorrent result ofjudicial deference to
administrative expertise, however, is the granting of unrestricted and unreviewed
discretionary authority to the undereducated and undertrained guard." d. See also,
Hirschkopf & Millemann, supra note 32, at 811-12.
286 Jones, 433 U.S. at 127.
287 O'Lone v. Shabazz, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2407 (1987).
288 Id. at 2405. The Court explained that "[bly placing the burden on prison
officials to disprove the availability of alternatives, the approach articulated by the
Court of Appeals fails to reflect the respect and deference that the United States
Constitution allows for the judgment of prison administrators." Id.
289 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987). Turner was decided on June 1st, 1987, and Shabazz
was handed down June 9th, 1987. Turner was a class action brought by inmates in
the Missouri prison system. Id. at 2257. In that case, the Court upheld a prison
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majority, restated the general test: "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.12 90 By itself,
the language of the standard was not very different from that set out
in cases such asJones29 ' and Bell. 29 2 Justice Rehnquist went on, however, to identify a number of factors to guide the inquiry into the
reasonableness of the regulations. First, "a regulation must have a
logical connection to legitimate governmental interests invoked to
justify it. ' 29 3 The requirement of a "logical connection," however,
does not appear to be any more burdensome than the "rational relationship" test under standard equal protection analysis. 29 4 The
Court cited evidence in the record to demonstrate that the policy
that required certain inmates to work outside the institution was related to the effort to solve an overcrowding problem described as
"critical." Moreover, the Court noted that the ban on inmates' reregulation that, with few exceptions, allowed prison officials to withhold mail between inmates if the officials determined that course of action to be "in the best
interests of the parties involved." Id. at 2258. However, the Court struck down
another regulation that presumptively disallowed marriages between inmates. Id.
at 2267. The state refused to allow such marriages unless there were "compelling"
reasons to do so, which meant, as the regulation was interpreted, only where pregnancy and the birth of an illegitimate child were involved. Id. at 2258. The Court
held that such regulation was not even reasonably related to the proffered penological goal. Id. at 2266.
290 Shabazz, 107 S.Ct. at 2404 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2261
(1987)). A year later in Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562
(1988), the Court upheld the censorship by high school officials of an article on
teenage pregnancy in a student newspaper. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 572. In assessing the constitutionality of the school officials' actions, the majority rejected the
standard first enunciated in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969), that restrictions on students' first amendment rights were invalid unless "necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with school
work or discipline... or the rights of others." Hazelwood, 108 S.Ct. at 567 (quoting
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)).
Instead, the Court adopted a new standard: "[W]e hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content
of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Id. at 571 (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).
The similarity to the standard adopted in Turner to govern restrictions on inmates' rights is striking. Yet neither the majority, nor even the strongly-worded
dissent by Justice Brennan remarked on this similarity. The equation of prisoners
and students for constitutional purposes probably provides little comfort to either
group.
291 See supra note 120-28 and accompanying text.
292 See supra note 133-44 and accompanying text.
293 Shabazz, 107 S.Ct. at 2405 (citing Turner v. Safley, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987)).
294 See Turner v. Safley, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2262 (1987) ("[A] regulation cannot be
sustained where the logical connection between the regulation and the asserted
goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.").
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turning to the institution alleviated additional pressure placed on
guards and congestion created at the main gate, both of which exacerbated security problems. Thus, the Court determined that the
regulations were valid under the first factor.295
Second, the Court examined whether the inmates had "alternative means of exercising the right.

'2 96

This inquiry was somewhat

more difficult. Muslim inmates did have many other opportunities
to exercise the right to worship their religion in prison, including
the right to engage in solitary prayer and the right to congregate
prayer at times other than during working hours. Moreover, prison
officials took a number of affirmative steps to accommodate Muslim
inmates, such as preparing a special religious diet for those who requested it, and making special arrangements during the month-long
observance of Ramadan, in which, inmates eat meals at special times
and engage in prayer.2 9 7 Because of the special time constraints involved, however, there were no alternatives to participating in the
Jumu'ah.
Despite the central role the Jumu'ah plays in the Muslim religion, the Court refused to force prison officials to bend the rules to
the logistics of the rite. Rather, the Court held that the opportunity
to participate in other facets of the religion was sufficient; the inability to participate in the Jumu'ah did not, in itself, make the regulations unreasonable. "While we in no way minimize the central
importance ofJumu'ah to respondents," declared Justice Rehnquist,
"we are unwilling to hold that prison officials are required by the
Constitution
to sacrifice legitimate penological objectives to that
8
end."

29

The third factor considered by the Court was the "impact that
accommodation of respondents' asserted right would have on other
inmates, on prison personnel, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.

' 29 9

The Court found a number of adverse conse-

Shabazz, 107 S.Ct. at 2405-06.
Id. at 2406 (quoting Turner v: Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2262 (1987)).
297 Id.
298 Id. To return to the point concerning unconstitutional motivation, it is interesting to note that Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Muslims' opportunity to
take part in other religious observances rendered the regulations at issue reasonable. Id. It is difficult, however, to see why the ability to participate in other services
indicates that the regulations at issue are reasonable. The willingness to make accommodations to the demands of the inmates' religion elsewhere is at least some
evidence that administrators, in passing the regulations, were not motivated by a
desire to discriminate against Muslims solely because of their religion. That, however, is only half of the inquiry. See supra notes 283-84.
299 Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. at 2406 (citing Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987)).
295

296
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quences that would result from failing to enforce regular prison
practices or policies to accommodate the Muslims' religious rights.
Assigning the inmates to work inside the main building on Fridays
would undermine efforts to solve the overcrowding problem, while
allowing them to work on weekend details would drain resources by
requiring extra supervision. As a general matter, the Court noted
that to develop special arrangements for the Muslims would create a
perception of favoritism that could lead to security problems.30 0
Moreover, the Court accepted the fears articulated by officials, that
accommodating Muslims who wanted to participate in the Jumu'ah
would risk allowing "affinity groups" to flourish in the institution.30 '
The Court did not totally reject the relevance of available alternatives, however, and conceded that they were relevant to the inquiry into the reasonableness of the regulations. Justice
Rehnquist's explanation of this factor was truncated compared to
the discussion of the same point in Turner, which is somewhat surprising in light of the centrality of the issue in the Third Circuit.
The Court did make clear however, that the relevance of alternatives
did not amount to a "least restrictive alternative" test: "we have rejected the notion that 'prison officials . . .have to set up and then

shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint.' "302
300 Id. at 2406-07. This reasoning overlooks the fact that other special arrangements had been made for Muslims at other times. In fact, as noted, prison officials
offered their willingness to make accommodations in other areas as evidence of the
reasonableness of the regulations at issue, and did not suggest that the other accommodations created a potential security problem. Justice Rehnquist does not
say why accommodating inmates attempting to participate in the Jumu'ah would
foster a perception of favoritism, but accommodating Muslims who request a special diet or who want to participate in the observance of Ramadan would not create
this problem. Indeed, the problem of a perception of favoritism, if applied in every
situation, could work against any efforts at accommodation at any time.
301 Id. Again, the rationale offered by the administrators proves too much. The
fear of "affinity groups," described by the Court as "a group of individuals ...with
one particular affinity interest," would lead to a ban of all congregate religious services by the institution, a step the administration did not otherwise believe was necessary. Id.
302 Id. at 2405 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2262 (1987)). In Turner, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, explained:
Finally, the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasona-

bleness of a prison regulation .... By the same token, the existence of

obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an "exaggerated response" to prison concerns. This is
not a "least restrictive alternative" test: prison officials do not have to
set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of
accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint ....

But if an

inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the
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justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens joined a passionate
dissent written by Justice Brennan. "Prisoners are persons whom
most of us would rather not think about, ' 3 0 3 Justice Brennan began. "Banished from everyday sight, they exist in a shadow world
that only dimly enters our awareness." 0 4 The dissent continued
that "[i]t is thus easy to think of prisoners as members of a separate
netherworld, driven by its own demands, ordered by its own customs, ruled by those whose claim to power rests on raw necessity." 3 0°

5

Justice Brennan reminded that "[nothing] can change the

fact, however, that the society these prisoners inhabit is our own.
Prisons may exist on the margins of that society, but no act of will
can sever them from the body politic."' 6
The dissenters objected strongly to the "reasonableness" standard accepted by the majority: "Such a standard is categorically
deferential and does not discriminate among degrees of deprivation ....

If a directive that officials act 'reasonably' were deemed

sufficient to check all exercises of power, the Constitution would
hardly be necessary. ' 30 7 More than this, the use of such a standard
sent a signal that prisoners' claims are of little importance, argued
Justice Brennan:
A standard of review frames the terms in which justification
may be offered, and thus delineates the boundaries within
which argument may take place. The use of differing levels of
scrutiny proclaims that on some occasions official power must
justify itself in a way that otherwise it need not. A relatively
strict standard of review is a signal that a decree prohibiting a
political demonstration on the basis of the participants' political beliefs is of more serious concern, and therefore will be
scrutinized more closely, than a rule limiting the number of
demonstrations that may take place downtown at noon.30 8
prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court
may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the
reasonable relationship standard.
Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262 (emphasis in original). In that case, the availability of
reasonable alternatives was important in the Court's decision to strike down the
regulation presumptively barring inmate marriages. Additionally, the availability of
alternative avenues of communication played an important role in the Court's upholding the ban on face-to-face interviews in Pell. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
303 Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. at 2407 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
304 Id.
305 Id. at 2408 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
306

Id.

307

Id.

308

Id. at 2409 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Justice Brennan advocated a variable standard rather than the
uniform standard employed by the majority.3" 9 If the activity involved was "presumptively dangerous" or if the restriction of the
activity related only to the time, place or manner of its occurrence,
the only question, according to Justice Brennan, was whether the
standard was reasonable.3 0 If, however, the activity was not dangerous and the regulation at issue curtailed the activity completely,
Justice Brennan would hold the regulation invalid unless it furthered an important governmental interest and the restriction was
"no greater than necessary to effectuate the governmental objective
involved." 3 '1 Such a standard, Justice Brennan asserted, "takes seriously the Constitution's function of requiring that official power be
called to account when it completely deprives a person of a right
'
that society regards as basic. "312
Finally, Justice Brennan argued that, even under the test the
majority claimed to apply, the regulations failed to pass constitutional muster. Justice Brennan again stressed the absolute nature of
the deprivation-the total inability to participate in the Jumu'ahand rejected the security concerns raised by the administrators as
mere pronouncements without any support in the record. l3 Justice
Brennan noted that in both the federal system and in Leesburg itself
for the five years before the regulations at issue were passed, prisoners were allowed to participate in theJumu'ah without incident. He
analyzed the alternatives at accommodation suggested by the inmates and accepted each as plausible.3" 4
On the most basic level of who won and who lost, Shabazz, like
Helms, is an example of the Third Circuit's efforts to reach a more
balanced approach to the accommodation between the rights of
those incarcerated and the legitimate interests of those charged with
the admittedly formidable task of running the institutions. Also, as
in Helms, that more balanced effort was largely, but not totally, repudiated by the Supreme Court. Yet, something of the Third Circuit's
approach survived. The "reasonableness" test set forth in Turner
and Shabazz was not, by itself, new. However, in attempting to clarify that standard, the Court set forth a number of factors to guide
courts in the assessment of the reasonableness of official actions.
Moreover, the Court conceded that the availability of "obvious, easy
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
3 13 Id.
3 14 Id.
'09

310
:ij
3 12

(citing Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1985)).
(quoting Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1033 (2d Cir. 1985)).
(quoting Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1033 (2d Cir. 1985)).
at 2413-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
at 24 12-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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alternatives" was at least a factor to be considered, although the majority fell short of requiring administrators to meet a "least restrictive alternative" test.
In determining whether Turner and Shabazz represent a softening of the approach dictated by the Court in the cases after Wolff, or
whether the pessimism and the passion of the dissenters are justified, it would fall to the lower federal courts, including the Third
Circuit, to give substance to the analysis insisted upon by the Court.
D.

Monmouth County Correctional Institution Inmates v.
Lanzaro: Giving Some Substance to the Test

At one level, all governmental action must be "reasonable,"
at least insofar as the government may not act in an arbitrary or
capricious manner. To require only that of the actions of governmental officials, however, effectively writes the Constitution out
of the analysis. Following the decisions in Shabazz and Turner the
question was whether courts were to define "reasonableness" to
require any more than the most minimal protection, or whether
the fact that constitutional rights were involved in a given case
mattered in the analysis. As usual, with the application of
Supreme Court decisions, that question was addressed first by
the lower courts. The Third Circuit, for one, answered that it did
matter when constitutional rights are involved.
The 1987 case of Monmouth County Correctional Institution Inmates v. Lanzaro 1 5 was an unlikely vehicle for an expansion of the
rights of those incarcerated. To be sure, conditions at the Monmouth County jail were so deplorable, that Judge Harold Ackerman of the United States District Court, three years earlier, held
that those conditions amounted to cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the eighth amendment." 6 The issue in Monmouth
County before the Third Circuit, however, was much narrower.
Specifically, it involved one of the most controversial issues in
the past fifteen years: the right to abortion. 7
The case involved a challenge to a county policy that refused
to provide access to or funding for "purely elective and nontherapeutic" abortions to inmates in the institution. Instead, inmates
:15 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1731 (1988).
316 Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 595 F. Supp. 1417
(D.N.J. 1984).
317 Monmouth County, 834 F.2d at 328. For a summary of the controversy generated by the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), recognizing the right to abortion, see D.M. O'BRIEN, supra note 170, at 23-43.
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desiring such abortions were forced to secure a court order temporarily releasing them from jail so they could arrange for the
abortions themselves. The plaintiffs argued that the county policy violated the inmates' right to privacy under the fourteenth
amendment. 3 " Additionally, they alleged that the state's refusal
to provide medical treatment deprived them of equal protection
of the law in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.3 9 Finally, the prisoners alleged that the county policy violated analogous provisions of the NewJersey Constitution. The
county, on the other hand, did not contest its obligation to provide "medically necessary" services to inmates. The county even
conceded its obligation to provide abortions that the jail physician determined to be medically necessary. However, because
the abortions at issue were "purely elective medical procedures,"
the county argued that it had no obligation to provide the
services. 2 °
Judge Ackerman, sitting in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey, issued a preliminary injunction,
striking down the county policy. 32 ' Relying in part on the
Supreme Court's decision in Martinez, 2 2 and on the Third Circuit's opinion in Shabazz, Judge Ackerman ruled that the county
policy had to be based on a "compelling" state interest and had
to satisfy a least restrictive alternative test.3 3 Applying those
standards, Judge Ackerman held that the county's policy impermissibly burdened the inmates' fundamental right to choose to
have an abortion, in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 2 4
Because Supreme Court precedent had established that the State
is not constitutionally obligated to provide funding for nontherapeutic abortions, 32 5 however, Judge Ackerman refused to hold
that the county's policy of refusing to provide funding also violated inmates' right to privacy. As a practical matter, that distinction became moot by Judge Ackerman's ruling that the failure to
provide funding violated the inmates rights under the eighth
Monmouth County, 834 F.2d at 329.
Id.
320 Id. at 334.
321 Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 643 F. Supp. 1217,
1221 (D.N.J. 1986), aff'd, 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1731
(1988).
322 See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
323 Monmouth County, 643 F. Supp. at 1223.
'324 Id. at 1228-29.
325 See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
318
319
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amendment and under the New Jersey Constitution. 2 6
The county appealed the grant of the preliminary injunction
and the Third Circuit affirmed. The Court did so despite the
Supreme Court's reversal of Shabazz which made clear that
neither the "compelling state interest" test nor the "least restrictive alternative" test was appropriate when analyzing regulations
burdening prisoners' rights. Judge Higginbotham, in an opinion
joined by Judge Rosenn, employed the test from Turner and
Shabazz and concluded that the county policy failed to32 meet
the
"reasonableness" standard established in those cases. 7
Judge Higginbotham first addressed the question of whether
the policy infringed on the right to privacy guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment. As in Helms and Shabazz, the court sided
strongly with the inmates seeking the abortions, citing the very
strong interest at stake for them. Relying on nonprison precedents, the court noted that hardly any decisions "are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to
individual dignity and autonomy than a woman's decision-with
the guidance of her physician and within the limits specified in
[Roe]-whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make
that choice is fundamental. ' 32" The court had little trouble finding that the right of privacy encompassing the right to elect to
have an abortion is a right retained upon incarcerationY.9 Further, Judge Higginbotham rejected the county's argument that its
policy did not infringe on the right to abortion. Rather, the court
found that the policy, although purporting to allow inmates to
seek court orders to gain release and arrange for abortions, actually amounted to a total denial of access to that procedure. Maximum security inmates would not realistically be able to secure a
court an order releasing them to obtain an abortion. Moreover,
even for low security inmates who might convince a court to release them, the delays inherent in obtaining a court ordered release and then arranging an abortion effectively denied them
access to abortions as well.3 3 °
326 Monmouth County, 643 F. Supp. at. 1223-27.
327 Monmouth County, 834 F.2d at 338-44.
328 Id. at 334 (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476

U.S. 747, 772 (1986)).
329 See id. at 334 n. 11. The county conceded this point and the Third Circuit
noted that the Supreme Court had recognized that prisoners retain similar aspects
of the right to privacy. Id. See Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987) (striking
down nearly absolute ban on inmate marriages); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942) (striking down sterilization program aimed at certain convicted felons).
330 Monmouth County, 834 F.2d at 337. AlthoughJudge Higginbotham did not cite
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The court not only disagreed with the county's concept of
the effect of the policy on the right to abortion, but more importantly, it rejected the county's efforts to justify the policy as well.
Judge Higginbotham first considered the main justification for
the policy offered by the county: the financial and administrative
burdens that would be imposed on the county if it was required
to provide access to and funding for purely elective, nontherapeutic abortions. Pointing out that the Supreme Court's decision
in Shabazz had not altered the requirement that the government
justify infringement of prisoners' constitutional rights by "a legitimate state interest,' ' 31 3 1 the court held that a desire to avoid financial and administrative burdens did not qualify as a legitimate
state interest. Economic considerations could play a role in devising the appropriate remedy for an infringement of a constitutional right, ruled Judge Higginbotham, but " 'the cost of
protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total
denial.' "332
Judge Higginbotham turned next to the question of whether
the county policy could be justified on the ground of security,
although he expressed doubt that this was the justification for the
policy. 33 3 Looking to the four factors set out in Safley to determine the reasonableness of the prison regulations, the court held
that the policy could not be justified by security concerns. First,
the court simply rejected categorically the claim that the policy at
issue had any valid, rational connection to legitimate security
concerns. "The court order requirement ... centers around the
nature of the treatment; it in no way relates to the gravity of any
perceived security risks." '3 34 Agreeing with a finding made by
any factual evidence to support his conclusions about the practical effect of the
county policy, one of the women whose request for an abortion led to the challenge
of the county policy did in fact experience significant delays in obtaining her release. Id. at 329.
33' Id. at 336 (citing O'Lone v. Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2405 (1987)).
332 Id. at 337 (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977)).
333 See id. at 336. Judge Higginbotham wrote that "[t]he sole governmental interest asserted by the County as justification for the policy is that unspecified, yet insurmountable, administrative and financial burdens will result if the county is
required to provide access to, and funding for, elective, nontherapeutic abortions."
Id. (footnote omitted). He continued that "the county has never affirmatively maintained on this record 'that security concerns underlie the challenged regulation.' "
Id. at 336 n. 15 (citations omitted). Both Judge Ackerman in the District Court and
Judge Mansmann, who wrote a concurring opinion, believed that the County was
asserting security concerns as justification for the policy. See Monmouth County, 643
F. Supp. at 1223; Monmouth County, 834 F.2d at 352 (Mansmann, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
334 Monmouth County, 834 F.2d at 338.
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Judge Ackerman, Judge Higginbotham noted that, " '[a]ll other
things being equal, inmates who wish to have an abortion pose
no greater security risk than any other inmate who requires
outside medical attention.'
Second, Judge Higginbotham considered whether the policy
left inmates alternative means to exercise the right to abortion
and concluded that the policy did not provide adequate alternatives. Judge Higginbotham repeated his findings that maximum
security inmates would be unable to secure a court-ordered release to arrange for an abortion. He also noted that low security
inmates would face delays that would effectively preclude exer36
cise of the right to have an abortion.1
Third, the court examined the impact that accommodation
of the inmates' right would have on other inmates and other
members of the prison community. The court not only determined that accommodating the right to elective abortions did not
affect other inmates, it also concluded that, for the same reasons,
the lower court's finding that there was no obligation to provide
funding for abortions was erroneous. Ironically, in this part of
his analysis, Judge Higginbotham reasoned that incarceration
gave rise to a right the inmates would not otherwise have. After
reviewing Supreme Court precedents that held that the government has no constitutional obligation to fund abortions, Judge
Higginbotham ruled that those decisions did not control when
the person asserting the right was incarcerated. "Whatever the
government's constitutional obligations to the free world, those
obligations often differ radically in the prison context. 3 3 7 Judge
Higginbotham pointed to the obligation to provide food and
housing to prisoners, obligations not constitutionally required of
government for the poor and homeless outside prisons. "Because of the very fact of incarceration," Judge Higginbotham
wrote, "the Supreme Court has recognized that "the public [is]
required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the
deprivation of his liberty, care for himself [or herself].' "338
Moreover, Judge Higginbotham noted that instead of requiring expenditure of greater resources, accommodating prisoners'
right to abortions would consume the same or fewer resources as
the medical care the prison would have to provide if prisoners
"

335 Id. (citation omitted).
336
337
338

Id. at 338-40.
Id. at 341 (citing Southerland v. Thigpen, 784 F.2d 713, 716 (5th Cir. 1986)).
Id. at 341 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
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carried their pregnancies to term. 39 He also rejected the idea
that providing abortions to inmates who wanted them would be
perceived as favoritism toward those inmates.3 40 He conceded
that the state may have a legitimate interest in encouraging natural childbirth over abortion. 4 ' In focusing on the penological
setting, however, he held that the interest could not be pursued
because "encouraging childbirth in the prison context furthers
none of the traditionally recognized penological objectives of rehabilitation, internal security or deterrence of crime. ' 342 Judge
Higginbotham concluded that:
We simply perceive no "significant ripple effect on fellow
inmates or on prison staff".., that would be caused by providing medical services to inmates choosing abortion equal or
comparable to those provided to inmates electing childbirth.
Nor has any reason been suggested why, in terms of costs, a
prison's obligation to accommodate the retained right of the
inmate to choose abortion should be treated any differently
339

Id. at 341-42.

340

Id.

This had been an important part of the rationale of the cases that refused to
find a constitutional obligation on the part of government to fund abortions. See,
e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
342 Aonmouth Countv, 834 F.2d at 342-43 (footnote omitted). Judge Higginbotham's reasoning-that government may not pursue what are concededly valid state
interests in the prison setting unless they also serve one of the legitimate penological objectives identified in Pell-is questionable at best. The legitimate penological
objectives identified in Pell (and nearly every prisoners' rights decision since that
one) typically serve the purpose of justifying restrictions on constitutional rights
that would not be acceptable but for the fact of incarceration and the special character and needs of penal institutions. Judge Higginbotham suggests the opposite
result: that the legitimate penological objectives, if not furthered by the particularrestriction, prevent the state from pursuing a policy it could have adopted if the
person involved was not incarcerated. But it is difficult to see why this should be
so. There is no reason why, as a general proposition, a state interest that is legitimate when applied to persons outside the institution automatically becomes less so
simply because the person who is the target of the policy is incarcerated. Why the
state may "encourage" free women to choose natural childbirth over abortion but
loses the power to attempt the same persuasion once a woman enters prison is not
clear.
That is not to say that the policy at issue is constitutional. The problem with
the county's analogy to Vaher and Beal is not that the state loses the power to encourage women in prison to opt for childbirth. It is that a policy that "encourages"
childbirth when applied to free women may, in effect, go well beyond mere encouragement and effectively preclude the exercise of choice. It is one thing to encourage women to carry a pregnancy to term when those women still have the free
choice to reject the government's suggestion and pursue an abortion; it is quite
another to set up cumbersome procedures, under the guise of "encouragement,"
that effectively prevent the women who are incarcerated from making their own
decision about abortion.
341

592

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 19:526

from its obligation to accommodate other fundamental rights,
such as access to the courts or free exercise of religion. In
those contexts, prison funds are routinely expended
to facili34 3
tate the meaningful exercise of the asserted right.
For these reasons, Judge Higginbotham found that the regulations
were an "exaggerated response" to the financial, administrative and
security concerns offered by the county officials and were thus
unreasonable.3 4 4
Judge Higginbotham devoted considerably less attention to the
issue of whether the policy constituted a violation of the eighth
amendment under the Supreme Court's "deliberate indifference"
standard announced in Estelle v. Gamble.3 4 5 Once again, Judge Higginbotham found that the "burdensome" court-ordered release
procedures insisted upon by county officials, as well as the failure of
those officials "even to attempt to minimize the delay in access to
abortion services" amounted to "deliberate indifference" to the inmates' medical needs.3 4 6 In addition, despite the characterization of
the abortions at issue as "elective," Judge Higginbotham had no
trouble finding that the women's medical needs in connection with
an abortion, as well as the consequences of a denial of those services, were "serious," satisfying the second prong of the Estelle
test.3 4 7
In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Mansmann agreed with
the result reached by the majority, but she did not accept all of their
reasoning. Although she agreed that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the fourteenth amendment privacy
issue sufficient to require affirmance of the grant of the preliminary
injunction, she objected to the breadth of the opinion.3 4 Judge
Mansmann accepted the county's claim that they were motivated by
security concerns in carrying out the policy. Nonetheless, she would
have held the policy unreasonable because it effectively prevented
exercise of the right to abortion and because an "obvious and easy"
alternative-allowing inmates seeking elective abortions to take advantage of the in-jail procedure for performing medically necessary
abortions-existed.' 4 9 Judge Mansmann also disagreed with the
Id. at 343 (citations omitted).
Id. at 344.
345 429 U.S. 97 (1976). See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
346 Monmouth County, 834 F.2d at 347.
347 Id. at 348-49 (citation omitted).
348 Id. at 352 (Mansmann, J., concurring).
349 Id. at 352-53 (Mansmann, J., concurring).
In identifying this "alternative,"
Judge Mansmann assumed that the purpose of the court-ordered release policy was
actually to accommodate, rather than burden, the inmates' right to seek abortions.
343
344
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majority that the refusal to provide elective abortions amounted to
"deliberate indifference" to "serious medical needs" in violation of
the eighth amendment. 3 50 The Supreme Court declined to take the
case.

351

The importance of Monmouth County lies not only in the immediate result of recognizing a right of access to, and funding for, elective abortions for women in jail. It is also significant for its effort to
give content to the "reasonableness" standard set out in the
Supreme Court's decisions in Turner and Shabazz, and for the careful
analysis engaged in by the court in reviewing the constitutional
claims at issue. Drawing an analogy to the analysis employed in
equal protection doctrine where the language is often quite similar,
Judge Higginbotham's decision certainly presents a much more
searching review than is typically found under the extremely deferential "rational relationship" test used to evaluate most classification schemes.3 52 Indeed, his skepticism of the sincerity of the
government's claim that security concerns lay at the heart of their
policies, and his willingness to second-guess county officials about
the financial and administrative burdens inherent in performing
elective abortions in the jail, provides an illustration. The Third
Circuit's approach in Monmouth County certainly calls for a much
more careful and exacting review than that required either under
the usual roll-over-and-play-dead standard of the "rational relationship" test or in the Supreme Court's prisoners' rights cases after

Wolff.
This is not to suggest that Judge Higginbotham's analysis is
wrong or insufficiently deferential. What makes Monmouth County
different, and what should make the case different from the run-ofthe-mill equal protection case, is that the prisoners asserted that
That assumption is questionable because Judge Mansmann's focus is too narrow.
After all, if all the county truly wanted was to accommodate inmates' efforts to secure elective abortions, it would simply have agreed to perform those abortions
along with all medically necessary abortions, as Judge Mansmann suggests. Perhaps the whole purpose of the policy was not to directly impede inmates' efforts to
seek abortions, but specifically to enable the county to avoid performing elective
abortions in thejail, whether for financial, administrative or security reasons, or simply because county officials believed that the use of county funds and jail facilities
to perform elective abortions is morally obnoxious. In light of that, it seems a little
odd, if not simply incorrect, to label as an "alternative" a course of action that
requires county officials to do precisely what they set out not to do.
350 Id. at 354-55 (Mansmann, J., concurring).
351

108 S. Ct. 1783 (1988).

See Lyng v. International United Auto Workers, 108 S. Ct. 1184 (1988); Lyng
v. Castillo, 106 S. Ct. 2727 (1986); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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their constitutional rights were being violated. The Third Circuit
took that seriously and gave it considerable weight in its analysis.
What, then, was the standard or level of review employed by the
Third Circuit in prisoners' rights cases, and what should that standard be? Assuming that courts are simply unwilling to subject
prison regulations to something close to strict scrutiny analysis because of the problems of running the institutions, perhaps the better
analogy is to cases like Eisenstadt v. Baird,3 53 and City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center,3 51 in which the Court claimed to apply a rational relationship test. In these cases, involving something close
to, but not exactly, a fundamental right or a suspect classification,
the court applied a much more careful review of the regulation at
issue. 5 5
Whether or not this is what the Supreme Court had in mind in
Turner and Shabazz, the Third Circuit's decision in Monmouth County
raises at least the possibility that the "reasonableness" test will provide some significant protection for the rights of inmates and a limitation on the actions of prison officials, at least in the hands of a
lower federal court like the Third Circuit. Justice Brennan's pessimism in dissent in Shabazz might be, if not unwarranted, at least
exaggerated.3 5 6
353 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried couples held unconstitutional).
354 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (ordinance prohibiting operation of home for mentally
retarded men and women held invalid).
355 See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). In Plyler, the Court refused to
apply either "strict scrutiny" or the "rational relationship" test but fashioned an
intermediate standard of review to strike down a Texas law denying access to education for children of illegal aliens, even though access to education is not a fundamental right and illegal aliens do not constitute a "suspect classification." Id. at
216-17.
See generally Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
.A Model For A Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Note, Legislative
Purpose, Rationalityand Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972). It is important not
to suggest that modern equal protection law is marked by definite standards, or
even much coherence and consistency. For judicial criticism of the state of flux of
equal protection law, see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,
460 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). It has
even been suggested that the very concept of equality has no substantive content.
See Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
356 The Third Circuit in Monmouth County, as well as the Court's own decision in
Turner, striking down the ban on inmate marriages, suggests that the analysis is
more searching than in the Court's decisions after Wolff. Decisions from other circuits applying the Turner test indicate mixed results. See, e.g., Williams v. Lane, 851
F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 879 (1989) (number of restrictions
on inmates in protective custody found invalid). However, decisions from a
number of other circuits indicate that the Turner test has not really changed the
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THE ROLE OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT IN PRISONERS' RIGHTS
LITIGATION

It is important not to overstate the case. The Third Circuit
analysis or will make much of a difference in terms of results. See, e.g., Pollock v.
Marshall, 845 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1988) (restrictions on inmate hair length held constitutional although allegedly contrary to an inmate's religious beliefs); Kahey v.
Jones, 836 F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1988) (failure to provide special non-pork diet for
Muslim inmate did not violate inmate's first amendment rights); McCabe v. Arave,
827 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding ban on group religious service for close
custody inmates, but striking down policy of refusal to shelve in the prison library
literature promoting racial hatred, where the literature did not also advocate violence); Rodriguez v. James, 823 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1987) (upholding prison directive
allowing officials to read prisoners' business mail). Even in the Third Circuit, a
second opportunity to address the rights of Muslim inmates to participate in group
religious services, this time while in a close custody unit, produced an opinion in
which the court, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Shabazz, had little
trouble upholding the ban on such services. See Cooper v. Tard, 855 F.2d 125 (3d
Cir. 1988).
As this article was going to print, the Supreme Court issued two more decisions in the area of prisoners' rights, both of which also leave a somewhat mixed
picture. In Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989), the Court vacated the lower
court judgment that had applied the standard enunciated in Martinez to prison regulations governing the receipt by inmates of publications from outside publishers.
The regulations, promulgated by the federal Bureau of Prisons, allowed officials to
withhold from an inmate any publication if that publication was found to be "detrimental to the security, good order or discipline of the institution or if it might
facilitate criminal activity." Id. at 1877. The regulations also provided that a publication may not be banned "solely because its content is religious, philosophical,
political, social or sexual or because its content is unpopular or repugnant." Id.
The regulations required issue by issue review of any periodical and even allowed
an appeal of a decision to ban an issue to be taken to the regional director of the
Bureau of Prisons. Id. at 1878.
The Court held that the proper standard to assess the validity of the regulations was not Martinez's relatively strict standard, but the "reasonableness" standard set out in Turner. The fact that the rights of non-inmates, as in Martinez, were
implicated, did not make a difference. In fact, although the majority admitted it was
not strictly necessary to its decision, it expressly overruled those portions of Martinez insofar as the earlier case held that the stricter standard applied to all mail coming into the prison. The stricter standard now applies only for mail leaving the
prison.
Nonetheless, the methodology of the decision at least suggests the influence of
a moderating force in contrast to the Court's decisions in Jones and Hudson.
Although the Court upheld the regulations, it carefully applied the factors drawn
from Turner to uphold the regulations. Among the elements of the regulations that
"comforted" the majority were that the regulations distinguished between rejection
that was detrimental to the security of the institution compared to rejection because
of religious, philosophical, political or social content, and also by the individualized
nature of the determinations required by the regulations. The Court also considered whether any "easy alternative" existed to accomplish the goals of the regulations and found that it did not.
There is also a "good news/bad news" flavor to the second decision last term,
Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 109 S. Ct. 1904 (1989). In that case,
the Court rejected the argument that prison regulations in Kentucky setting forth
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has not unquestioningly sided with inmates at every opportunity,
nor has it been insensitive to the concerns of prison administrators. Still, it is fair to say that the Third Circuit, at least in the
cases examined, has been more receptive to the recognition and
accommodation of the constitutional rights of inmates than has
the Supreme Court over the past decade.3 57 Given the Supreme
Court's record during that period of time, such an assessment is
certainly faint praise.
categories of visitors who might be excluded from visitation gave rise to a protectible liberty interest in receiving other visitors. Nonetheless, the Court was prepared to concede that prison regulations may, if they are sufficiently strict in
controlling decision-making, create an enforceable liberty interest in a prison setting. At least for the time being, the Court stopped short of a ruling that prison
regulations may never, by themselves, create protective liberty interest for inmates,
the direction in which the Court appeared headed from Wolff to Helms.
357 How typical these three decisions are of the entire body of the Third Circuit's
work in this area is another question. The results are again mixed. There have
been other cases in which the court has extended Supreme Court precedent and
analysis to situations not considered by the Court with the result that inmates were
accorded more rights. For example, in Main Rd. v. Aytch, 522 F.2d 1080 (3d Cir.
1975), the court extended the analysis in Martinez to strike down regulations
prohibiting inmate press conferences that were called to criticize the public defender system. Id. at 1089. Equally as significant, the decision was based on the
rights of the inmates, not the rights of the media. Id. at 1086. Similarly, in Inmates
of Allegheny County v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1979), where inmates
launched a broad-ranging attack on conditions at an institution, the court extended
the eighth amendment's guarantee of adequate medical care beyond physical illness to the much more problematical area of psychiatric care. Id. at 763. The
Third Circuit was one of the first, but not the first circuit to do so. See Bowring v.
Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977). And recently, in Ryan v. Burlington County,
860 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1988), the court held the Commissioner of Corrections of
the New Jersey Department of Corrections personally liable for injuries sustained
by an inmate in a county jail from an attack by state prisoners in a very overcrowded
prison cell. Id. at 1209. Nonetheless, there are certainly many cases in which the
court has passed on opportunities to extend the rights of inmates and simply applied precedent that appeared to be controlling or adopted an analysis that was
very deferential to prison officials. See, e.g., Cooper v. Tard, 855 F.2d 125 (3d Cir.
1988) (upholding ban on Muslim group religious service while in a close custody
unit); Wilson v. Schillinger, 761 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1985) (upholding regulations
governing hair length applied to Rastafarian inmate); Union County Jail Inmates v.
DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1983) (refusing to hold double-bunking unconstitutional based on space considerations alone); Saint Claire v. Cuyler, 634 F.2d 109
(3d Cir. 1980) (rejecting claims of Muslim inmate that enforcement of institutional
rules governing clothing violated his first amendment rights).
It is interesting to note that the holding in Monmouth County was not followed or
even cited by the Eighth Circuit in Reproductive Health Services v. Webster, 851
F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988), rev d, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). In an opinion that was
otherwise hostile to the various restrictions placed on abortions by the Missouri
statutory scheme, the court refused to declare invalid the practice by Missouri
prison officials of transporting inmates outside the institution to obtain abortions,
rather than requiring officials to provide abortions. In so holding, the Court of
Appeals reversed the lower court's decision. Webster, 851 F.2d at 1083-84.
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A more important issue, however, is what lies behind the results in the individual cases. Specifically, do the Third Circuit
decisions reveal a significantly different approach in the area of
prisoners' rights litigation from that taken by the Supreme Court
or do those decisions represent only different judgment calls
from what the Court would have decided in close cases? Perhaps
the evidence suggests that the Third Circuit's approach in prisoners' rights cases has been significantly different from that taken
by the Supreme Court, and it is this different approach that
makes the Third Circuit's contribution to the area of prisoners'
rights substantial.
That different approach taken by the Third Circuit comes
from diverse views in the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit
regarding the parties and the interests involved. In the Supreme
Court decisions since Wolff, we have been presented with two
competing images. Prisoners, at least in the view of a majority of
the Court, are almost invariably portrayed in the starkest terms:
antisocial, usually violent, involuntarily confined and therefore
presumptively unable to control their behavior or to conform it
to any civilized standard or58set of rules. As Chief Justice Burger
3
wrote in Hudson v. Palmer:
Prisons, by definition, are places of involuntary confinement of
persons who have a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial,
criminal, and often violent, conduct. Inmates have necessarily
shown a lapse in ability to control and conform their behavior
to the legitimate standards of society by the normal impulses
of self-restraint; they have shown an inability to regulate their
conduct in a way that reflects either a respect for law or an
appreciation of the rights of others.3 5 9
The Court's portrait of prison officials is not as fully developed.
It is fair to say, however, that the Court sees the operation of a
prison as an extremely complex undertaking, requiring difficult decisions that are fraught with danger. Prison officials do their best to
make the difficult decisions and handle a troublesome population.
The effect of such a view of the competing interests and parties
is two-fold. First, of course, it lessens respect for inmates and for
their claims about what is at stake for them when prison officials
adopt regulations infringing upon their constitutional rights. Second, it makes the interests of the institutions appear overwhelming;
the view of prisoners, added to the general complexity of running
358

468 U.S. 517 (1983).

3'

Id. at 526.
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the institutions, requires that the deference necessarily granted to

administrators be so expansive as to amount almost to abdication.
As Jonathan Willens has summarized the view:
Prisoners, then, are not citizens with "the dignity and intrinsic worth of every individual" but, rather, hardened
criminals. They threaten the safety of prison guards, administrative personnel, visitors and themselves. Institutional security requires a "constant fight against the proliferation of knives
and guns, illicit drugs, and other contraband" that lead to riots, escapes and murder in the prison. The prison is, just as
guards have always said, "always about to blow." The necessities of institutional security become paramount because the institution itself appears at risk. The legal analysis lends itself to
this swing toward custody....
The courts stress the complexity of prison problems. The
constant risk of violence requires an assessment of danger that
involves more than the individual case and specific facts.
Prison officials must make intuitive judgments based on imponderable factors, necessarily subjective and predictive.
Their expertise is almost mystical. It not only justifies deference by legitimating the delegation of discretion, but finally it
requires that courts remove themselves from the process.
Prison is so complicated and0 so dangerous that judicial inter36
vention can only do harm.
Willens, supra note 18, at 122-23 (footnotes omitted).
Whether this view of inmates apparently held by the Court is in fact currently
shared by correctional officials is questionable. In his important study of the correctional facilities of three states - Texas, Michigan and California -John J. DiIulio, Jr. describes the "keeper" philosophy shared by administrators in all three
systems. That philosophy, although obviously not discounting the possibility of
inmate violence, is much more generous in its view of inmates and much more
receptive to the notion of inmates' rights than judicial decisions such as Hudson.
According to Dilulio, the central tenets of this philosophy are as follows:
There are two basic principles which together constitute the keeper
philosophy. The first is that, whatever the reasons for sending a person
to prison, the prisoner is not to suffer pains beyond the deprivation of
liberty. Whatever the law says, and whatever the prevailing wisdom
among commentators and outside experts, prisoners should not suffer
any punishments inside prison except those which may be incidental to
their confinement: confinement itself is the punishment. A corollary to
this principle, and the second basic tenet of the keeper philosophy, is
that regardless of this crime, a prisoner should be treated humanely and
in accordance with how he behaves inside the institution. Even the most
heinous offender is to be treated with respect and given privileges if he
behaves well once behind the walls.
J. DIIULIO, JR., GOVERNING PRISONS 167 (1987). Of course, the fact that such a
philosophy is widely shared does not mean that there are not significant differences
in how prisons are run and how much control and discipline are exercised over
inmates. Dilulio, for example, describes the Texas system, operated on a "control
360
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The Third Circuit's view of life in the institutions, however, appears to be somewhat more balanced. Certainly, institutional concerns, including security, are taken seriously. But the Third Circuit
decisions, particularly Shabazz and Monmouth County, accept the possibility that prison officials may overstate or overreact to security
concerns, and that prison officials may even act in bad faith, a view
to which a majority of the Supreme Court has paid only lip service.
Most importantly, the Third Circuit decisions take seriously the inmates' side of the dispute. Prisoners are not invariably antisocial;
moreover, the Third Circuit has realized that the inability to exercise certain fundamental rights while incarcerated causes serious
harm to those in prison.
This is of more than passing literary interest. In his dissent in
Shabazz, Justice Brennan worried about the message implicit in judging restrictions on first amendment rights against a deferential standard of "reasonableness" rather than a stricter standard. 3 6 1 The
importance of Justice Brennan's concerns goes beyond its symbolism. In its approach, the Supreme Court over the past decade has,
without admitting it, skewed the analysis and abandoned any real
effort at the kind of mutual accommodation between the rights of
those incarcerated and the interests of those running the institution.
This abandonment has resulted in part from the one-sided view of
the interests involved.
Much has been written of the vagueness of various provisions of
the Constitution and of the difficulty in discerning the meaning of
its important terms.3 6 2 It has been much less frequently remarked
model," as a much more tightly run system than the Michigan system operated on
the "responsibility model," or the California system operated on a "consensual
model." See id. at 165-87. Two further observations seem to be in order. First,
while DiIulio's description of the keeper philosophy suggests that the Court's harsh
view of inmates is out of step with prison officials' view of inmates, the prison officials' philosophy, if true, suggests that officials are motivated by the good faith with
which the Court credits them. Secondly, the generous "keeper" philosophy, even if
widely shared, has far from eliminated the need for court intervention into the system. Indeed, the Texas system was embroiled for over ten years in landmark litigation that became almost a paradigm for system-wide prisoners' rights litigation. See
id. at 212-16 (citing Ruiz v. Estelle, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982)).
361 See supra notes 303-08 and accompanying text.
362 The literature on this subject is quickly becoming voluminous. See, e.g., J. ELY,
supra note 27, at 11-41; M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (1982); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L.
REV. 204 (1980). Some have gone so far as to argue that drawing meaning from the
indeterminate language of the text of the Constitution is simply impossible. Compare, e.g., Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1982); Tushnet, A Note on
the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 683 (1985) with
Tushnet, Does Constitutional Theory Matters, 65 TEx. L. REV. 777 (1987). On drawing
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that the same problem is found with regard to the language of the
tests devised by the Supreme Court to aid in giving meaning to the
various constitutional guarantees. 6 3 In particular, the language of
the Supreme Court's test for assessing the constitutionality of
prison regulations infringing the rights of inmates-currently
phrased as requiring an assessment of whether the regulation is
"reasonably related to legitimate penological interests"-is, by its
terms, vague and indefinite. Of course the same is true of tests devised in other contexts, such as the "clear and present danger" test
in first amendment analysis, 3 64 the various attempts at a definition of
pornography, 65 and whether, under the eighth amendment, a punishment violates "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. "366 In contexts other than the area of
prisoners' rights, the vagueness of the constitutional tests is at least
offset by the fact that the Supreme Court takes seriously the interests of the person asserting the right, or the fact that a constitutional
right is being asserted. 36 7 This by itself provides some guidance or
help in applying the test. It gives some "constitutional ballast" or
focus which help to ensure that the effort to accommodate the constitutional interests at stake is meaningful.
In the area of prisoners' rights, however, this has been missing
from the Supreme Court decisions since Wolff, at least until Turner.
Although purporting to balance interests, the Court's attempts at
meaning from the language of legal texts generally, see White, Law as Language:
Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 415 (1982).
363 Robert Nagel, for one, has noticed, and criticized, the proliferation of tests or
standards to replace analysis of the constitutional text. See Nagel, The FormulaicConstitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165 (1985).
364 Compare Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
365 Compare Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) with Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973). Recall, also justice Stewart's famous statement in jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), where he said that he could not define hard-core pornography, "[blut I know it when I see it." Id. at 197.
366 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
367 In his famous dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919),Justice
Holmes dismissed the leaflets opposing the war effort prepared by the anarchists
on trial for sedition in that case as "poor and puny anonymities." Id. at 629
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, for reasons related to the nature of the first
amendment itself and its role in the search for truth in a democratic society, Justice
Holmes perceived the interest protected by acquitting the defendants. Id. There is
an interesting side note to Justice Holmes's readiness to dismiss the anarchists and
their message. Almost certainly unknown to justice Holmes, along with most of the
other persons involved with that case, the English translation of the leaflet was considerably watered-down when compared to a version drafted in Yiddish that was
also distributed. See R. POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE
SUPREME COURT AND FREE SPEECH 49-55 (1987).
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accomodating the needs of the institution and the interests of the
inmates have been shams. The Court gives more than enough
weight to the interests of the administrators, but when it turns to
consider the interests of the prisoners, it sees nothing there. It is
hardly surprising that, as the Court balances the interests, the scale
hardly ever tips in favor of the prisoners; one side of the scale is
practically empty.3 6 8
Not so with the Third Circuit, which has shown a willingness to
take seriously the interests of the inmates as part of the constitutional equation. The court has, at least in the cases examined, consistently recognized the loss suffered by the inmate as a result of the
official action, and has recognized the value that exercising constitutional rights has for the inmates. In Helms, Shabazz, and Monmouth
County, this view has shifted the balance and resulted in decisions
favorable to the prisoners. But even if inmates do not always prevail, as in Mims v. Shapp,3 6 9 the approach of the Third Circuit is truer
not only to what the Court says it is doing, but what it should be
doing if we are to take seriously the proposition that inmates do not
lose all their constitutional rights at the prison gate.
The Third Circuit's different approach to prisoners' rights litigation has thus led to results that the Supreme Court apparently
would not adopt. After all, in view of cases such as Meachum,
Montanye, and Ohm, 37 0 the Third Circuit in deciding Helms might cer-

tainly have anticipated the Court and might have deferred to prison
administrators on the decision of whom to place in administrative
segregation. Even more strikingly, when the court fashioned a more
rigorous standard in Shabazz to address its perceived dissatisfaction
with the deferential Saint Claire standard, 3 7 ' certainly it could not
have believed that that dissatisfaction came from a Supreme Court
that had decided Bell and Hudson. Nor is it at all certain that a Court
that decided Bell would recognize the right of pretrial detainees to
have access to (let alone funding for) elective abortions while incarcerated or would find constitutionally "unreasonable" the institution's insistence that inmates seeking to exercise their right to
abortion obtain a court-ordered release. The Third Circuit's differ368 Perhaps because prison population is disproportionally composed of minorities, one cannot help but recall Ralph Ellison's description of blacks who attempt to
assert themselves and refuse to submit to the role pre-ordained for them in the
dominant white world as "invisible." See generally R. ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN

(1952).
369
370
371

744 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1984). See supra notes 233-41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
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ent approach to prisoners' rights litigation raises as a final point a
more fundamental issue concerning the interaction of the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts, which are bound to follow Supreme
Court rulings. Is the Third Circuit's approach legitimate in light of
the tenor and results of the recent Supreme Court cases discussing
prisoners' rights? Is Judge Hunter correct in his dissent in Shabazz
that the "mutual accommodation" required by Wolff had been
watered down by the Supreme Court in subsequent cases, 3 72 suggesting that the Third Circuit's effort to give that accommodation
real meaning has gotten away from what the Court intended?
It has been argued that the Constitution has a meaning independent of that which any person or body, including the Supreme
Court, declares. As a result, the argument goes, lower federal
courts who are convinced that the Court has erred in interpreting
the Constitution have an obligation to disregard the Court's interpretation and follow their own interpretation. 3 That overstates
the matter;3 74 to give lower federal courts carte blanche, unrestricted by Supreme Court precedent neither describes accurately
how lower federal courts generally approach their task, nor is it
clear that such an approach is desirable.3 7 5
372 Shabazz v. O'Lone, 782 F.2d 416, 423-24 (3d Cir. 1986) (Hunter, J.,
dissenting).
373 See S. A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 5 (1984). Interestingly,
one of the takeoff points of Barber's analysis is a speech by Justice Marshall before
the judges of the Second Circuit at the Second Circuit Judicial Conference in 1979.
In his speech, Justice Marshall told his audience that he believed that the Second
Circuit, and not the Supreme Court, had reached the right decision in Bell in subjecting the regulations affecting the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees to
strict scrutiny and invalidating them. Id. at 2-4.
374 The notion that the Constitution may have a meaning other than that handed
down by the Supreme Court is not new. See, e.g., Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466,
491-92 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[T]he ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it."); R. DWORKIN,
supra note 108, at 211-12. Indeed, the issue of the appropriateness of a court that is
technically bound to follow Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution that
chooses to depart from the Court's analysis when it believes it to be mistaken dates
back at least to the antebellum debates over constitutional issues raised by the slavery question. See R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED, 185-87 (1975) (discussion of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's refusal to follow Supreme Court precedent in a case
concerning the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850); Soifer, Book
Review, 67 GEo. L.J. 1281 (1979) (reviewing W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA (1977)).
The further argument that, because of the formal autonomy of the constitutional text, lower federal courts are free to follow their own view of the Constitution is not a part of constitutional orthodoxy.
375 Purely from the point of view of results, it matters as usual, whose ox is being
gored. Those who applaud, for example, the Third Circuit's more generous approach to prisoners' rights as preferable to that currently in vogue among a major-
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Lower federal courts should follow Supreme Court precedents
that directly control a case before them.3 7 6 But that does not require them to act merely as predictors of what the Supreme Court
would do were the case before the higher court. Lower federal
courts have the opportunity and incentive to exercise considerable
judicial independence, 37 7 both because lower federal courts such as
ity of the Supreme Court, must discern a way to distinguish the refusal of a number
of lower federal courts to implement in a meaningful way the Court's decision in
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See R. KLUGER, SIMPLEJUSTICE 75152 (1975); J. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 80-87 (1979). There is a difference between the two that makes the former a legitimate exercise of the judicial
power and the latter an improper exercise, for reasons that will follow. This position, however, is not based on the results of those decisions.
376 To state this as a general proposition is not to gloss over the fact that reasonable minds may differ whether the result in a given case is directly compelled by
existing Supreme Court precedent. That may be the most difficult question to answer.
One example of a case in which the lower court refused to follow Supreme
Court precedent is West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943). Barnette is famous not only for its holding that students could not be compelled to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, but for its quick reversal of Minersville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), in which the Court had reached the
opposite conclusion. The lower court decision in Barnette was issued by a threejudge panel. Barnette v. WestVirginia State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D. W.
Va. 1940), aff'd, 619 U.S. 624 (1943). That panel refused to follow Gobitis and enjoined the board of education from enforcing a regulation compelling Jehovah's
Witnesses to salute the flag. See Barnette, 47 F. Supp. at 255. The lower court did
not contest the general principle that it was obligated to follow Supreme Court
precedent directly on point. It declined to do so in that case for a number of reasons, including that a majority of the Justices had publicly criticized the Gobitis decision as unsound since it was handed down and had refused to cite it in a subsequent
case. Id. at 253. The lower court concluded that
[u]nder such circumstances and believing, as we do, that the flag salute
here required is violative of religious liberty when required of persons
holding the religious views of plaintiffs, we feel that we would be recreant to our duty as judges, if through a blind following of a decision
which the Supreme Court has thus impaired as an authority, we should
deny protection to rights which we regard as among the most sacred of
those protected by constitutional guaranties.
Id.
This is also not to ignore the problems presented when other branches of the
government, federal or state, refuse to follow or raise questions about the binding
effect of Supreme Court decisions, such as Abraham Lincoln's remarks about the
limited effect of Supreme Court decisions in response to the Dred Scott decision. See
D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScoTr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW &
POLITICS, 442-43 (1978).
377 Woodford Howard has written,
[i1n theory, of course, federal judges form a pyramid that supports the
will of the Justices [of the Supreme Court]. In reality, federal judicial
power is widely diffused among lower court judges who are insulated by
deep traditions of independence, not only from other branches of government but also from each other. So strong are the sources of frag-
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the Third Circuit usually have the first chance to decide important
issues of law and, even more so, because the vast majority of their
cases are not reviewed by the Court, rendering the lower courts the
actual courts of last resort. 37" As long as the result in each case is
reasoned and legitimate, given the breadth of the language of earlier precedent and otherwise comports with prevailing ideals ofjudicial craft,3 79 it is no usurpation of power for a court to issue a
decision that results in an expansion of rights or some other outcome that one might reasonably expect the Supreme Court would
not adopt had they considered the issue. This is especially so in
cases such as Monmouth County, where the Third Circuit's analysis at
least attempted to work within the framework established by the
Court, and Shabazz, where the Third Circuit saw itself addressing an
area or issue on which it reasonably believed the Court had not spoken definitively.
Finally, such lower court judicial independence is important because these courts serve not simply to implement Supreme Court
decisions, or to decide issues the Court does not address. Even in
areas where the Court speaks frequently, such as on issues of constitutional rights, lower courts make a valuable contribution to the development of such rights by what they have decided and the reasons
they offer in support. The cases examined here offer an illustration.
In the lower courts, both the Third Circuit in Shabazz and the Eighth
Circuit in Turner had applied something close to a "least restrictive
alternative" test to the prison regulations under attack. The
Supreme Court reversed much, but not all of the lower courts' analyses. In its decisions in Turner and Shabazz, the Court rejected the
requirement of a "least restrictive alternative" test, but it did not
reject the importance of such alternatives altogether. Moreover, for
the first time, the Court set forth a number of factors to be considered in determining the "reasonableness" of prison regulations that
infringe inmates' constitutional rights. It seems likely that the lower
court opinions had at least some influence on the Court's decisions
in those cases.
The interaction between the lower courts and the Supreme
Court has continued after the decisions in Shabazz and Turner, as
mentation, in fact, that the most challenging questions are: what keeps
the federal judiciary from flying apart? Why is consensus actually more
characteristic of circuit courts than conflict?
J. HOWARD, supra note 13, at 3.
378 See W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 24-25 (1964).
379 See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970);

Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
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lower courts apply the standards in new cases. The Third Circuit's
application of the Court's standard in Monmouth County indicates that
the new standard has more substance to it than the Court's approaches in Jones and Bell. For the time being, Monmouth County is
binding precedent in the Third Circuit; it may also be taken as persuasive precedent elsewhere, to be followed, built upon, criticized
or rejected. Whether the Supreme Court itself will offer a clarification remains to be seen. The dialectic goes on.
Of course, this "dialogue" between the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts, including the Third Circuit, may be more metaphor than reality. In any event, it is a dialogue between unequals
and the Supreme Court has the right to declare the lower court
wrong and to end the conversation, similar to what it did in Helms.
But I think further study of the doctrinal influence of lower court
opinions on the Supreme Court's work in important areas of constitutional law would reveal that the Court rarely does not at least
listen.

